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Lisa T. Alexander*
ABSTRACT

The efficacy of the public-privatepartnershipas a tool for social reform is the
subject of continued scholarly and public debate. New governance theory, an
increasinglypopularform of jurisprudence, constructs an optimistic vision of
stakeholder collaborationin public-privatepartnershipsthat justifies the use of
the public-private partnership in regulatory reform. New governance scholars
contend that recent governance trends such as devolution, deregulation, decentralization, and privatization create opportunitiesfor previously marginalized
stakeholders to more fully participate in public problem-solving. New governance scholars expect that both public and private stakeholders, with differing
interests, skills and objectives, will effectively collaborate to solve public
problems in the absence of traditionalformal legal protections. New governance 's implicitpromise is that traditionally marginalizedstakeholders, such as
poor public housing residents, will be empowered as a result of their participation in social reform. This Article examines stakeholder participation in
Chicago's landmark ten-year HOPE VI public housing reform experiment as a
test of these claims. Chicago's reform process is a national example as other
cities replicate Chicago's model. Specifically, this Article examines the effect of
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social fissures along race, class and gender lines on the participationof public
housing residents in Chicago's urban reform plan. This micro-study of Chicago's
process reveals that empowered stakeholderparticipationis difficult to achieve
under conditions of social conflict in the absence of traditional rights-based
protections. This Article proposes a balance between "hard-law" and "soft-law"
measures to provide a public lawframeworkforfuture nationalHOPE VI reform.
These recommendations may guide future new governance reform efforts that
include traditionallymarginalizedstakeholders in public-privatecollaborations
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"At the bottom of the Deep Blue Sea, drowning mortals reached silently and
desperatelyfor drifting anchors danglingfrom short chainsfar far overhead,
which they thought were lifelines meantfor them."

Patricia J. Williams 1
INTRODUCTION

On May 27, 1999, Chicago's Mayor Richard M. Daley formally announced
"the beginning of a new era in public housing in Chicago." 2 His pronouncement
introduced Chicago's landmark public housing reform plan, known as the "Plan
for Transformation" (the "Plan").3 Chicago's Plan is the nation's largest recent
urban public housing reform process given the number of units slated to be
demolished and rebuilt.4 Chicago's Plan is a national example as many other
cities replicate Chicago's innovations.5 Chicago's Plan is financed, in part, by a
1.5 billion dollar public subsidy 6 from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") to the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") under7
the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere Program ("HOPE VI").
HOPE VI is U.S. federal legislation, formally enacted in 1992, and revised in

1. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 1 (1991).
2. Janet L. Smith, The Chicago Housing Authority's Planfor Transformation, in WHERE ARE POOR
PEOPLE TO LIvE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HousING COMMUNITIES 93, 101 (Larry Bennett et al. eds., 2006).
3. Id.; see also Chi. Hous. Auth., The CHA's Plan For Transformation-Plan Summary, http://
www.thecha.org/transformplan/plan-summary.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
4. CHI. Hous. AUTH., PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION BROCHURE 2 (2002) available at http://
www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/plan-for-transformation-brochure.pdf (explaining that "[n]o other
city in America has ever attempted public housing reform of this magnitude."). Chicago demolished
38,000 severely distressed units of public housing and is slated to rebuild 25,000 units of public housing.
Smith, supra note 2, at 93.
5. See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh et al., Chicago Public Housing Transformation: A Research Report, at i
(Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Urban Research & Policy, Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.curp.columbia.edu/publications2/PHTransformation-ReporLpdf (explaining that "[tihe experiences of family relocation
and resettlement in Chicago have informed other cities facing similar challenges").
6. Smith, supra note 2, at 93.
7. See Venkatesh et al., supra note 5, at 2.
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1998, with the broad goals (1) to redevelop severely distressed public housing
developments; (2) to de-concentrate the poverty of public housing residents; and
(3) to create viable, diverse, mixed-income communities. 8
Chicago's Plan is also an example of new governance approaches to public
reform. Scholars describe "new governance" as a variety of alternative approaches to regulation that eschew government mandated rules, norms and
directives that are issued from the top down and are implemented primarily by.
governmental actors. 9 New governance approaches encourage non-governmental
stakeholders to formulate and to implement the non-binding norms, goals and
directives that shape regulatory reform.1 ° Chicago's HOPE VI reform effort
reflects new governance trends, such as deregulation, decentralization, and
privatization, since some of the Plan's interim decision-making is delegated to
local public-private collaborations guided by broad directives and motivated, in
part, by profit-making goals."1
New governance jurisprudence, 12 an increasingly popular form of legal

8. HOPE VI was enacted in 1992 under Section 24 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 as
amended by Section 535 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-276)
(QHWRA). See Janet L. Smith, Public Housing Transformation: Evolving National Policy, in WHERE
ARE POOR PEOPLE To LIVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 19, 31-37
(explaining the goals of HOPE VI legislation); see also U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., About HOPE
VI, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (explaining
the key goals of HOPE VI public housing transformation); NAT'L Hous. LAW PROJECT, FALSE HOPE: A
CRmcAL AssESsMErr OF THE HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, at i (2002),
availableat http://www.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf (explaining that HOPE VI was created in
1992 in response to the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program and that "[i]n the first nine years of
the program, HUD awarded over 4.5 billion dollars in competitive grants to PHAs to redevelop 165
public housing sites in 98 cities").
9. See generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND THE US 65 (Grinne de Btirca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2006) (compiled scholarly articles on new governance in the U.S. and in the EU).
10. Seeid. at3.
11. See, .e.g., Larry Bennett et al., Introduction,in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING
PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 3-4 (describing Chicago's public housing reform plan as
privatizing property management); Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE V, Accountability and the
Privatization of Public Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1477 (2003) (describing Chicago's
transformation of its Cabrini-Green Development as an example of the privatization of public goods and
services) [hereinafter Note, When Hope Falls Short].
12. U.S. legal scholars have analyzed new governance trends that emerged in the U.S. and the EU as
early as the mid-1980s to the present. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof
DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance
in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000)
[hereinafter Freeman, The PrivateRole]; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bound Pragmatism,87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003); James F. Liebman &
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School
Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 343 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
LitigationSucceeds, 117 HA~v. L. REv. 1016 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the
Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FoRDtAm URa. L. J. 1611 (2001); Susan Sturm, Second
GenerationEmployment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001); David
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scholarship, constructs an optimistic vision of stakeholder collaboration. New
governance jurisprudence implies that positive long-term outcomes are possible
for traditionally marginalized stakeholders who participate in substantially
deregulated public-private collaborations.' 3 Similarly, a stated objective of
Chicago's Plan is to include public housing residents in such public-private
reform collaborations. 14 The implicit promise of Chicago's Plan is that residents'
participation in such decision-making networks will lead to an equitable
distribution of the benefits of public housing reform. 15
Yet, Chicago's ten-year HOPE VI public housing reform process is a
cautionary tale. The Chicago example reveals that it is difficult for traditionally
marginalized stakeholders to attain concrete benefits from public-private collaborations in the absence of traditional rules and rights-based legal protections. As
the profit motive pervades urban reform, Chicago's Plan unfolds against the
backdrop of mounting social tensions over access to, and control of, urban
space. 16 As this Article describes, increasingly complex social stratification along
race, class and gender lines poses unique challenges for new governance's model
of collaborative stakeholder participation.
While early new governance scholars discussed positive examples of stakeholder collaboration in deregulated public-private partnerships,1 7 they rarely
analyzed the effect of social fissures on micro-level decision-making and

Trubek & Louise Trubek, Hard andSoft Law in the Constructionof Social Europe: The Role of the Open
Method of Coordination, 11 EuR. L.J. 343 (2005); Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21 s'
Century Regulatory State, 86 TEx. L. REv. 819 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AND THE US, supra note 9).
13. In her early work, Professor Audrey McFarlane critiqued the "stakeholder" justification for
community participation in urban reform, which is similar to the new governance conception of
stakeholder collaboration. She argued that the stakeholder model failed to recognize that "the
development process is weighted to protecting certain interests," and that "inconsistent goals will be
discarded as irrational, impractical or simply undesirable." See Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion
Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participationin Economic Development, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 861, 902 (2001). This Article expands upon those initial observations by outlining new
governance theory's vision of stakeholder participation; analyzing Chicago's ten-year HOPE VI public
housing reform plan as an example of the theory; analyzing the effect of race, class and gender on
stakeholder collaboration; and proposing concrete reforms for future HOPE VI legislation.
14. See CHI. Hous. AUTH., supra note 4, at 3 (describing mechanisms to include residents in the
decision-making structures).
15. Id.
16. See Cheryl L. Reed, Class Conflict Hits Home, Cm. SuN-TMIMEs, Nov. 14, 2005, at 12 (explaining
growing class conflicts between middle-class, working, and poor blacks on Chicago's South side).
17. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization and Participatory
Citizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS 1, 5 (Clare Dalton ed., 2005)
(discussing examples of successful experimentation with public-private partnerships in a variety of legal
domains); Salamon, supra note 12, at 1614-15 (noting the importance of third-sector non-profit and
for-profit organizations in public-private partnerships); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance andSoft Law
in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 139, 145 (2006) (describing the use of public-private
collaborations in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)).
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collaboration. 18 Many new governance scholars extolled the benefits of deregulated stakeholder collaborations for innovation in public reform.1 9 Yet, at the
same time, such scholars underemphasized the harmful distributional consequences of such decision-making networks for marginalized groups. While some
new governance scholars acknowledged that traditional regulation and litigation
could at times "disentrench" established institutions,20 many others advocated
provisional and non-binding norms and standards as preferable to traditional
public law regulation and litigation. 2' Increasingly, many new governance
scholars acknowledge that traditional rights-based regulation and litigation may
need to operate in tandem with new governance processes.2 2 Yet, few scholars
have analyzed how such processes should be structured at the micro-level.
This micro-study of the Chicago experience shows that under conditions of
social conflict "hard law' 23 protections can enhance, rather than undermine the
participation of marginalized stakeholders in such reform networks. While
scholars continue to debate the social utility of resident participation in urban
reform,24 this Article asserts that participation has a normative dimension; it is
not merely an end in itself, but a means through which traditionally marginalized

18. See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 503, 503 (2008) (reviewing THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE
EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) (describing new
governance as "macro in its orientation")).
19. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND THE US, supra note 9, at 3-4 ("Important features of these regimes
seem designed neither to resolve disputes or to vindicate accepted values, but to induce learning and
innovation.").
20. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 12, at 1062 (defining destabilization rights as formal legal rights
enforced through traditional public law litigation that destabilize and "disentrench" change-resistant
bureaucratic public institutions).
21. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 12, at 344 ("The new governance model connotes a decentering of
legal scholarship, challenging the traditional focus on formal regulation as the dominant locus of
change."); Grdinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 9, at 3-4 (describing new
governance as in favor of regulatory approaches that are "less rigid," "less prescriptive" and "less
committed to uniform outcomes").
22. See discussion infra Part IV-B.
23. See David M. Trubek et al., 'Soft Law,' 'Hard Law' and EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 9, at 65 (defining "hard law" as traditional regulation
and "soft law" as non-binding directives).
24. See, e.g., Susan Bennett, "The Possibility of A Beloved Place": Residents And Placemaking in
PublicHousing Communities, 19 ST. LoUIs U. PUB. L. REv. 259, 304 (2000) (describing levels of resident
participation in HOPE VI public housing reform generally); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just
Rewards of So Much Struggle": Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35
HOFsTRA L. REv. 37, 41 (2006) (arguing that "public/private redevelopment of urban community space
must be controlled by and directly benefit the affected city residents"); McFarlane, supra note 13, at 865
(arguing for an empowerment theory of community participation that explicitly connects participation to
a redistribution of decision-making power); Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets The FinalNo: Tenant
Participationin Public Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 659, 660 (2000)
(providing guidelines to temper, but not eradicate the role of tenants in public housing redevelopment).
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stakeholders2 5 can secure positive long-term outcomes from urban redevelopment. Without sufficient public law protections, resident participation in urban
reform may not result in positive long-term outcomes, but may only serve to
legitimate reform plans that gentrify poor communities and privilege ruling-class
interests. Residents may more "meaningfully participate" in such informal
stakeholder collaborations if their participation is bolstered by a public law
framework. 2 6 At the same time, new governance collaborations guided by
non-binding directives, protocols, or standards may still be necessary to promote
innovation in public housing reform.
Part I of this Article explains new governance scholars' apt critique of
traditional "command and control" regulation and rights-based public impact
litigation. Part I also outlines new governance theory's concept of "empowered
participatory governance". Part I further illustrates that the profit-motive, a
growing form of power in urban reform, creates unique problems for new
governance's concept of collaborative stakeholder participation.
In Part II, this Article illustrates that HOPE VI reform, in general, and
Chicago's Plan in particular, reflect new governance trends. Specifically, Sections
C I and C2 of Part II examine two deregulated local decision-making processes in
Chicago's HOPE VI reform experiment; namely, (1) the birth of the mixedincome norm in Chicago; and (2) the creation of site-based resident screening
criteria at each redevelopment. These processes reveal that social conflict along
race, class and gender lines affects both individual and institutional stakeholder
representation and collaboration in urban reform. Part III describes two contrary
HOPE VI redevelopment processes governed by consent decrees that led to
accountable development in Chicago. These examples show the benefits of hard
law protections for traditionally marginalized stakeholders in regulatory reform
collaborations.
Part IV summarizes the lessons learned from Chicago's public housing reform
experiment. Admittedly, a single-city case study has some limitations, since legal
frameworks, political institutions and cultures differ in every city or locality. Yet,
Chicago is a significant laboratory in which to examine the circumstances that
can undermine stakeholder collaboration and to identify what conditions are
necessary for meaningful community input in new governance processes under
conditions of social conflict. Part IV also analyzes a recent federal bill which

25. Professor Boa Santos during a roundtable on new governance and new legal realism defined
marginalized stakeholders as "the invisible, discardable, and excluded populations that, of course, are
absent [and] silenced". Joel Handler et al., Symposium, A Roundtable on New Legal Realism,
Microanalysis of Institutions, and New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005
Wis. L. REv. 479, 505 (2005).
26. See Poindexter, supra note 24, at 660 (explaining that current funding guidelines for HOPE VI
require housing authorities to engage in "meaningful" community participation in the planning process
without defining "meaningful"); see also Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 12, at 28
(defining meaningful participation as "[tihose solutions that foster continued engagement and require
joint responsibility for implementation, monitoring, and revision").

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XVI

seeks to reauthorize national HOPE VI funding and to resolve the previous law's
shortcomings. While this bill is promising, the mechanisms for resident
participation in the bill resurrect traditional "top-down" participatory measures.
Such measures may not enhance "meaningful resident participation. 2 7 Drawing
upon the insights of the Chicago example and emerging new governance
scholarship, Part IV proposes a balance between traditional hard-law and
soft-law new governance measures to provide a public law framework for HOPE
VI reform. Lastly, the conclusion explains the implications of these findings for
future HOPE VI reform efforts and for other new governance experiments that
include traditionally marginalized groups.
I. NEW GOVERNANCE AND COLLABORATIVE STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

A. The Critiqueof "Command and Control" Regulation and Public Impact
Litigation
New governance theory represents a paradigm shift in contemporary legal
scholarship about the appropriate role of traditional administrative regulation,
adjudication, and public impact-litigation in public problem-solving.2 8 New
governance theorists aptly critique the traditional "top-down". "command and
control" model of regulation that originated in the New Deal era.29 Under this
model, regulatory goals and objectives were developed by federal agencies filled
with bureaucratic experts. 3 ° Such agency experts advanced regulatory goals
through detailed rule promulgation. 3 ' Public interest advocacy groups, in turn,
would comment on a proposed regulation through traditional notice and
comment periods.3 2 Courts could then require agencies to respond to the factual,
analytical, and policy submissions made by the various participating interests and
to justify policy decisions with detailed reasons supported by the rulemaking
record.3 3

27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 379 (critiquing the old "command and control" regulatory model's
one-size-fits-all approach); see also Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 966 n. 74 (discussing the burdens
placed on regulated entities by highly prescriptive "command and control" regulation).
30. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 371 (explaining that "[d]uring the New Deal Era, a key feature of the
organization of law and order was the commitment to centralized, institutional decision-making
authorities relying on professional, official expertise").
31. See id. at 373 (arguing that the regulatory powers of administrative agencies were predicated upon
the belief that the technocrats who ran administrative agencies possessed "superior knowledge,
information, and expertise").
32. See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that "only after the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking do parties supply detailed arguments about the technical and practical
difficulties of implementing a rule, instead of much earlier when the information might be more valuable
to the agency in formulating the proposed rule").
33. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. Eu- L. 565, 569 (2007) ("Experts and affected stakeholders do not participate
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New governance theorists contend that this older model of regulation provided
limited opportunities for marginalized groups to meaningfully participate in the
formulation and implementation of regulatory goals.3 4 To the extent that various

public interest groups could participate in the goal-setting process, groups with
more power and influence might easily dominate the process.3 5 Powerful groups
could "capture" a given agency by convincing the relevant bureaucrats to weaken
regulatory standards or to accept certain rationales for a lack of industry
compliance.3 6 Proponents of new governance contend that this regulatory
approach was ineffective and failed to promote broad public participation.
According to new governance scholars, the ineffectiveness of this "top-down"
approach to regulation was caused in part by law. 37 Law operated as a rigid
mandate, thereby creating distance between parties rather than facilitating
collaboration and coordination. 38 Regulatory laws were inflexible in that they
could not easily respond to uncertainty or adapt to change. 39 Regulatory solutions
were also ineffective because they were devised with limited information and
generated by distanced experts, rather than by individuals and institutions
involved in implementation on the ground.4 °
New governance scholars also critique the public interest impact-litigation
model of public problem-solving, most prevalent during the 1960s and 1970s.4 1
Under this model, representative plaintiffs, led by public interest lawyers, sued
public institutions using a class-action model of litigation, in the hopes of
transforming such institutions. In many areas of public service provision, judges
in elaborating norms; their role is to supply facts, interpretations, and legal arguments, which are then
").
processed by the judicial decision-maker ....
34. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 373 (explaining that the new governance model "challenges [the new
deal's] conventional assumptions" and seeks "to [involve] more actors in various stages of the legal
process").
35. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-FirstCentury, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437,
445 (2003) (describing the limitations of the interest representation model of administrative law such as
the accountability of the interest representatives to their claimed constituencies and the development of
regulatory solutions that fail to secure the broad public good).
36. See id.; see also Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 74-75
(1985) (describing agency "capture" by well-organized groups).
37. See generallyIntroduction, in LAw AND NEW GOVERNANCE iNTHE EU AND US, supra note 9, at 65
(explaining that "law either has not caught up with developments in governance, or it ignores
developments which do not conform to its presuppositions, structures and requirements").
38. See Trubek, supra note 17, at 149 (outlining the limitations and failures of traditional "hard law"
measures).
39. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 364 ("Not only have the techniques of law become outmoded and the
need to design second generation legal strategies become apparent, the aspirations of law and policy have
themselves undergone transformation.").
40. See Katherine R. Kruse, InstitutingInnocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment,
2006 Wisc. L. Rev. 645, 677 (explaining the purposes of information in the new governance
experimentalist paradigm).
41. William Simon describes the new governance movement's, and the law-and-society movement's,
focus on two clusters of organizational forms, namely, the command and control bureaucracy of the new
supra note
deal and the rights-recognizing judiciary associated with the Warren Court. See Handler et al.,
25, at 498.
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supervised the reform of public institutions via judicial standard-setting enforced
through consent decrees.42 During the remedial stage of public litigation reform,
consent decrees operated as regulatory codes,4 3 requiring judicial supervision
and micromanagement of administrative processes. 44 New governance theorists
contend that judges and public interest lawyers often lacked the technical
expertise and information necessary to effectively reform public institutions. 45
Public law litigation also provided limited opportunities for class representatives
to meaningfully participate in the goal-setting and the decision-making aspects of
public reform.4 6

Early federal government stewardship of public housing exemplified new
governance scholars' criticisms of command and control regulation. Congress
created public housing through the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937 (the
"1937 Act"). 47 The 1937 Act structured public housing as a federally regulated,
but locally managed endeavor. The 1937 Act provided local government control
of public housing by authorizing the creation of local public housing authorities
(PHAs) to "build, own, and operate housing for low and moderate income
households. 4 8 Yet, the federal government maintained control over the scope
and direction of public housing provision through top-down mandates in federal
statutes and regulations, and the Annual Contributions Contract ("ACC")
executed by the federal government and local PHAs.49
Special interest groups also substantially influenced Congress and federal
agencies regarding the normative objectives of public housing provision.
Initially, the powerful private real estate lobby resisted the creation of public
housing, calling it "socialistic and wasteful". 5" The real estate lobby's true
concern was competition from units created and maintained by the government. 1
Congress was able to justify public housing as an effort to assist a temporarily
"submerged middle class" coming out of the Depression. 2 While the real estate
lobby could not entirely thwart the creation of public housing, it encouraged
Congress to mandate that PHAs maintain the lowest standards of housing
construction and to require that PHAs reserve public housing units for the poorest

42. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 12, at 1044.
43. Id. at 1024.
44. See id. at 1025.
45. See Scott & Sturm, supra note 33, at 569.
46. See generally William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism,46 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 127, 164 (2004) (explaining that the structure
of rights-based impact litigation encourages "lawyers to limit client participation").
47. Pub. L. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1437-1437z-7 (2000).
48. Michael H. Schill, DistressedPublic Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. Cm. L. REv.
497, 499 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
49. Id. at 499-500.
50. Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CoRNELL L. REv., 878, 896 (1990).
51. See Schill, supra note 48, at 502.
52. See Schill, supra note 50, at 896.
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households.5 3 From the enactment of the Housing Act of 1949 until the creation
of HOPE VI in 1992, federal public housing policy primarily encouraged PHAs
to target their housing towards the lowest income households.5 4 As such, national
public housing policy was captured by local and national groups, and public
housing residents had few opportunities to substantially 55participate in the
determination and direction of federal public housing policy.
Public impact-litigation to stem racial segregation in the siting of public
housing developments in Chicago was also largely ineffective. Chicago's
landmark Gautreaux v. CHA case, and its progeny, marked the beginning of
substantial class-action public-impact litigation to curb intentional racial discrimination in the development of public housing.5 6 Yet, even after federal court
rulings held such practices to be unconstitutional, racial segregation in public
housing continued unabated.5 7 Many advocates also criticized the Gautreaux
litigation for failing to include class representatives in critical decisions regarding
the direction of the litigation and the remediation of past discrimination. 58
B. Stakeholder Participationin New Governance
New governance scholars contend that recent shifts in governance approachessuch as privatization, devolution, deregulation and decentralization-have
created increased opportunities for non-bureaucratic stakeholder participation in
public problem-solving. 59 While traditional liberals and rights advocates view
such governance trends with trepidation and skepticism, new governance
theorists see these trends as opportunities for democratic citizen participation.60
In contrast to traditional "command and control" regulation, new governance
approaches utilize local and informal networks of private and public stakeholders
who are involved in complex, but collaborative, institutional relationships. These
approaches draw on the pragmatism of American philosophers such as John
Dewey. 6 1 New governance scholars expect stakeholder networks to collaborate
53. See Schill, supra note 48, at 503-04.
54. See generally Schill, supra note 48, at 510-13 (describing federal legislation that contributed to the
concentration of poverty in public housing).
55. See generally McFarlane, supra note 13, at 871-873 (discussion of resident participation in public
housing redevelopment prior to HOPE VI); Poindexter, supra note 24, at 662-664 (same).
56. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 265 F.Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (summarizing the initial
allegations in the Gautreaux complaint); see also Lisa T. Alexander, A Sociolegal History of Public
HousingReform in Chicago, 17-wTR J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & Comm. DEV. L. 155, 156 (2008).
57. Schill, supra note 48 at 515.
58. See Alexander, supra note 56, at 169 n.93.
59. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 345; see also Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 155, 195 (2000) (describing non-bureaucratic stakeholder participation in the Habitat Conservation
Plan).
60. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 12, at 317.
61. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 284-85. See generally JOHN DEwEY, TRE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 143-219 (1927) (arguing that a sense of the "public" can be regenerated through local citizen

experimentation).
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in the formulation of interim goals and to revise and reformulate those goals
through continued experimentation and implementation. 62 The various stakeholders are perceived to continually hold each other accountable to achieve those
goals.63 As Professor Orly Lobel explains:
Collaboration thus promotes mutual accountability, defined as "accountability
among autonomous actors committed to shared values and visions and to
relationships of mutual trust and influence that enable renegotiating
expecta64
tions and capacities to respond to uncertainty and change."'
Each stakeholder brings a different type of local information and feedback to the
process of creating interim regulatory goals and to the assessment of the
feasibility of the goals. Armed with better information, the stakeholder network
can more effectively reformulate the regulatory goals in response to feedback.65
This approach is viewed as inherently more dynamic, flexible, and responsive
than previous New Deal regulatory approaches. 66 It can more effectively respond
and adapt to unintended consequences and to change.
Law also plays a "softer" role by guiding the collaboration of interested
stakeholders and facilitating the creation of mutually beneficial solutions, rather
than imposing rigid mandates.6 7 The "relational" nature of the collaborative
networks is assumed to result in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation.
Stakeholders are not viewed as self-interested; rather they are viewed as forced,
by the inadequacy of past approaches and by the realities of a new complex
information-based economy, to willingly collaborate towards the resolution of
public problems and the achievement of shared goals.68
C. Reflexive Organizationaland InstitutionalNetworks
Marginalized stakeholders participate in new governance's regulatory reform
networks primarily through institutions and organizations. 69 The institutional and
organizational participation of traditionally marginalized constituents in new
governance networks can be categorized into at least three prevailing forms: (1)
local and periodic, but open, public meetings, (2) community-based elected
representatives in public and private governing bodies or councils, and (3)
62. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 9, at 37, 56.
63. See Lobel, supra note 12, at 378.
64. See id.
65. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 27.
66. See Trubek, supra note 17, at 149.
67. See id.
68. See Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance, supra note 12, at 22-23.
69. See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HAlv. J.L. & GENDER 247, 250-251 (2006) (defining the role of "organizational catalysts"
and "institutional intermediaries" in new governance reforms).
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third-sector non-profit or privatized organizations with community- or constituency-based boards. New governance scholars often discuss examples of organizational and institutional participation that fit into one or more of the abovementioned categories. 7 °
For example, Professors Michael Doff and Charles Sabel in their article, "A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism," established the contours of the
first two forms of institutional democratic participation through a construct
known as the "governance council. '71 The authors analogize the "governance
2
council" to the "design team" in an engineering project.7 The "governance
council" includes public officials, other local administrative agents and officials,

service providers, and citizen users.7 3 The service providers are the key link
between the users of the service and public officials.

4

Service providers use their

expertise to communicate with and to obtain information75from the "citizen users"
regarding existing barriers to improving service quality.
In such networks, effective participation allegedly occurs through periodic
public meetings or through institutional bodies such as "housing authority
advisory councils" or "ad hoc municipal task forces." 76 The representatives in
these ad hoc groups or councils may vary over time, and individuals and
organizations may participate, or be asked to participate, as the public officials'
and service providers' challenges change. Through this mechanism, the average
citizen is thought to participate effectively and to collaborate with other
stakeholders in the institutional network "to address larger questions of
institutional architecture. 77
According to new governance proponents, accountability and collaboration

70. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLtJM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 41, 45
(2001) (arguing that several police departments have already moved toward a model of interpreting data
and problem-solving that stresses collaboration with experts, researchers, service-providers, and
community groups); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 12, at 184 (explaining that two intermediary nonprofit
organizations affiliated with the University of Texas at Austin aggregated data collected by all schools in
Texas to hold lower-level authorities accountable); Tracey L. Meares, Social OrganizationandDrug Law
Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.191, 226 (1998) (arguing that illegal drugs and violence in inner-city
communities cannot be remedied without social organization and networks between law enforcement and
community members); Sturm, supra note 12, at 491-519 (arguing that private companies' efforts to
address workplace discrimination should include mediating institutions, composed of nongovernmental
organizations, including insurance agencies, employee caucuses, unions, and consulting organizations);
Louise G. Trubek, Old Wine in New Bottles: Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization,28
FoRDHAM URB.L.J. 1739, 1745-46 (2001) (explaining how her non-profit public interest law organization
formed a coalition of consumer and health care professional groups to meet with managed care
organizations, administrative agencies, and the state legislature, to identify problems in the quality and
accessibility of health care).
71. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 12, at 316.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id.
76. Id. at318.
77. Id.
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emerge from these institutional networks by necessity. 78 Each constituency needs
the other in order to complete its task. Doff and Sabel contend that in the area of
public housing reform, for example, "the quality of service provided depends so
directly on the contribution of the beneficiaries that their active participation
manifestly makes them co-providers. '79 Doff and Sabel also assert that ".... the
way the occupants of public housing use their homes shapes the maintenance,
public security, and other services they need from the housing authority, and the
services provided by the housing authority plainly shape the conditions of
occupancy."80 As such, collaboration and accountability are presumed necessary
for each participant to further its own objectives in the network.
The third form of institutional and organizational democratic participation,
formal board representation, is prevalent throughout many of the sectors studied
by new governance scholars.81 In the affordable housing and community
economic development ("CED") sector, Professor William Simon describes how
community-based board participation is incentivized in various CED statutes and
regulations. He explains, "[m]ost programs supporting CED have a board that is
'representative of,' 'responsible to,' or 'accountable to' the community or its
low-income members. 8 2 Many of the statutes and regulations that provide
federal public subsidies to spur private investment in CED require that
participating non-profit third-sector organizations have boards that reflect the
demographics of the local community. As Simon explains, the federal HOME
Program, for example, requires that only one-third of boards of directors of
non-profit Community Housing Development Organizations ("CHDOs") can be
comprised of government or business sponsors.8 3 The Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI) requires that prospective organizations
applying for "Community Development Bank" status have at least 50% of their
governing boards comprised of nominees submitted from a committee of
community-based leaders.8 4 Through such regulatory requirements, policymakers seek to provide incentives for local groups to structure organizations that are
responsive to the needs of local citizens or constituents.
New governance theory is thus more than a mere descriptive account of the
processes of privatization, deregulation, decentralization and devolution. New
governance's construct of collaborative and "empowered participatory gover-

78. Id. at 319; see also Lobel, supra note 12, at376.
79. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 12, at 317.
80. Id. at 318.
81. See supra text accompanying note 70; see also Trubek, supra note 70, at 1744 (describing
non-profit organizations as ideal service providers because they tend to have participatory internal

structures).
82. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMuNrrY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW BustHESs & THE
NEW SOCIAL PoLIcv 173 (2001).
83. See id. at 174.
84. See id.
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nance"8 5 thus provides a normative justification for new regulatory trends
because it suggests that accountable reform is possible through public-private
collaborations. The concept of "empowered participatory governance" implies
that the benefits of new governance approaches will outweigh their costs, since at
least two primary norms of the administrative state-transparency and accountability--can be achieved through collaborative democratic participation. Public
decisions are made transparent through information sharing, peer review of local
decisions, and agency evaluation of institutional and organizational performance. 86 Accountability flows from transparency, since participating individuals,
organizations and institutions can allegedly hold each other accountable to
achieve interim regulatory goals because they are armed with better information."
Consequently, one alleged benefit of collaborative stakeholder participation is
that marginalized constituents will be empowered. Their needs and concerns will
be articulated and considered in such networks through a continuous process of
organizational feedback and collaboration. Furthermore, in a complex technical
and global economy, new governance scholars expect that continued and
sustained collaboration will produce key information, unique insights, and key
innovations that will make regulatory reform more effective. This account of
collaborative governance, however, underestimates the complex operation of
power within institutions and organizations under circumstances of social
conflict.
D. Informality and Soft Law
New governance theorists' faith in the benefits of collaboration leads them to
view informal mechanisms as preferable to rigid rules for ensuring accountability. 88 While traditional command and control regulation elevates formal law and
government agencies as the protectors of marginalized constituents' rights and
needs, many new governance scholars posit that marginalized stakeholders'
rights and needs will be better recognized and respected as a result of informal
standard setting and continued stakeholder collaboration.89 Since empowered
participatory governance is constructed as an inherently collaborative process, it
85. See Archon Fung & Eric Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered ParticipatoryGovernance, in
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOwERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 5

(Verso 2003) (explaining the phrase "empowered participatory governance").
86. See Kruse, supra note 40, at 681 (explaining that transparency promotes accountability by making
"the measured success or failure of particular institutions available to both institutional monitors and
community stakeholders").
87. See id.
88. See William H. Simon, Solving Problemsvs. ClaimingRights: The PragmatistChallenge to Legal
Liberalism,46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 210 (2004).
89. See Kruse, supra note 40, at 683 ('The experimentalist governance paradigm promises that by
being more closely involved in a collaborative and ongoing process of creating and revising the rules that
govern their behavior, local actors will be more invested in complying with them.").
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leads new governance theorists to resist formal and rule-based approaches to
regulation, and to embrace informal "soft law" approaches which would promote
accountability within regulatory networks. As Professor Louise Trubek explained
in her discussion of new governance in the health care arena, "[g]uidelines,
benchmarks and standards that have no formal sanctions are important elements
in new governance." 90 Thus, new governance in its purist form eschews formal
rights and administrative mandates as effective tools to solve problems. 9 Under
this conception, formal rules that mandate the participation of marginalized
groups are ultimately indeterminate.9 2 As circumstances change, the enforcement
of rigid rules proves illusory. Cooperation is hindered, rather than facilitated, by
court-imposed sanctions for failure to comply.
Instead, new governance relies primarily on information pooling between
organizations and institutions involved in problem-solving. Through information
pooling, organizations are encouraged, rather than forced to improve performance.93 Agency benchmarking and evaluation of organizational performance,
as well as cataloging of "best practices," also create incentives for network
participants to improve their performance and to innovate to resolve public
problems. New governance's account of the limits of rights and of judicial
enforcement illustrates formal law's indeterminacy, but it discounts the symbolic
value of rights for marginalized groups.9 4 Under circumstances of unequal
bargaining power, information asymmetries, and distributional conflict, the
possibility of rights based claims and the specter of court supervision can bolster
the bargaining position of marginalized groups and force their needs to be
respected. 95 This may be particularly true when the profit motive pervades the
localized agenda of the on-the-ground networks in inner-city reform. 96 This
Article questions whether the new governance account of organizational and
institutional collaboration, guided primarily by soft-law mechanisms, is adequate
to promote participation and accountability under circumstances of profound
social conflict.

90. Trubek, supra note 17, at 149.
91. See Kruse, supra note 40, at 682 ("[D]emocratic experimentalism can be seen as an informal
system of governance that trades rights-enforcement for more organic systems of accountability ...
and civic engagement that may never materialize.").
92. See Simon, supra note 88, at 170.
93. See Kruse, supra note 40, at 681.
94. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From DeconstructedRights, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.401,405 (1987) (discussing the symbolic importance of rights for blacks).
95. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Koruhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950,968-69 (1979) (explaining how the formal laws and rules used in divorce court
provide the parties certain bargaining chips in negotiations outside of court).
96. See generally Patience A. Crowder, Ain't No Sunshine: Examining Informality and State Open
Meeting Acts As the Anti-PublicNorm in Inner-City Redevelopment DealMaking, 74 TENN. L. REv. 623,
639 (2007) (explaining that informality in inner-city deal making subordinates community interests and
elevates the interests of business elites).
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E. The Missing Analysis of Power

Much new governance scholarship tends to de-emphasize public problems that
involve complex relations of power, where gains for the most marginalized
stakeholders must be obtained at the expense of gains for more empowered
stakeholders.97 New governance proponents correctly identify the limits of prior
governance approaches. However, in developing an alternative theory, many
studies highlight examples of positive organizational and institutional collaboration, while underemphasizing examples of social reform characterized by
conflict. Many new governance scholars identify macro-processes that contain
participatory elements, but "bracket" critical questions of distribution and power
at the micro-level. 9 8 One commentator described this optimistic view of
organizational and institutional collaboration as a "jurisprudence of hope." 99
Many examples of regulatory reform cited by new governance scholars are also
in fields such as civic environmentalism, workplace regulation, and information
technology-most of which consist predominately of technical professionals
working through collaborative organizational networks.1 ° Such professionals

97. Although not all public problems can be reduced to a zero-sum game, there are many public
problems whose resolution has been consistently plagued by complex power dynamics and some social
conflict. This is particularly true in the context of dwindling public resources to resolve problems. While
inner-city urban reform is not always a zero-sum game, the revitalization of urban spaces often leads to
gentrification and the attendant displacement of renters, public housing residents or other groups. See
Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification:Lessons Learnedfrom the D.C.

HousingAuthority's HOPEVI Projects, 10-SuM J. AFF. Hous. & Comm.DEV. L. 353 (2001).
98. Professor William Simon, for example, acknowledges potential threats to the legitimacy of new
governance, such as distributive justice, but he asserts that such concerns must be "bracketed" in order to
fully appreciate the innovative potential of new governance approaches. See Handler et al., supra note 25,
at 506 ("It is a salient feature of these institutions that would trouble you, and I think should trouble
anybody, that they tend to bracket distributive questions-that they tend to focus on the possibility of
collective gains, mutual gains, and hope that those gains will be large enough so that it will be worth it to
people not to focus on the distributive gains.").
99. See Kruse, supra note 40, at 683 (explaining that the vision at the heart of democratic
experimentalism is based largely in a jurisprudence of hope). At the writing of this Article, hope is
increasingly becoming a motivating force in politics. President Barack Obama emerged victorious from
the 2007-2008 democratic primaries and the 2008 election largely because of the contagion of hope.
While the author concurs that hope is a necessary force in today's politics, new governance theory's
jurisprudence of hope is misplaced in some circumstances. More than hope is needed to bolster the
participation of public housing residents in HOPE VI reform. See generally Note, When Hope Falls
Short, supra note 11.
100. See, e.g., Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 12, at 1 (describing collaborative

governance in the fields of health and safety and environmental regulation); Orly Lobel, Agency and
Coercion in Laborand Employment Relations: FourDimensionsof Power in Shifting Patternsof Work, 4

U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121 (2001) (exploring different patterns of work and production, and the
possibilities for worker organization and employee voice in various settings); Jody Freeman & Daniel
Farber, ModularEnvironmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795 (2005) (proposing a modular conception
of environmental regulation characterized by flexible coordination between government agencies and
public and private actors); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as EnvironmentalRegulation: TRI and
PerformanceBenchmarking Precursorto a New Paradigm,89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) (describing the use

of performance monitoring and benchmarking in the area of environmental regulation); Sturm, supra
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may be similarly situated in terms of educational and social capital, bargaining
endowments and access to information with which to devise shared goals. Such
equities can lead to the development of "win-win" solutions to technical
problems.
Without an investigation of how power-particularly in the form of race, class
or gender dynamics-may operate "on the ground" to thwart organizational
collaboration, new governance theory may fall short in analyzing the most
intractable public problems, such as those in which various stakeholders'
interests are juxtaposed against one another, rather than oriented towards
cooperation. New governance studies have given little attention to how race,
class, gender and other social fissures impact the effective representation of
marginalized constituents' interests in such reform collaborations.' 1 Additionally, virtually no scholars have analyzed how race, class and gender dynamics
affect the actual realization of HOPE VI's stated commitment to
the robust
10 2
decision-making.
reform
in
residents
housing
public
of
participation
Emerging new governance legal scholarship increasingly acknowledges the
serious challenges that informal collaboration poses to the robust participation of

note 69, at 252 (explaining the role of organizational catalysts in workplace equity); David Post & David
R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New Theory of DecentralizedDecisionMaking in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 1055 (1998) (discussing new governance and
decentralized decision-making in the field of complex systems). But see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 12
(describing new governance approaches in educational reform); Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sable &
William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessonsfrom Child Welfare
Reform, passim (Columbia Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 08-162, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1088020 (describing new governance approaches in social welfare policy).
101. While many new governance studies do not explicitly discuss race, class and gender, a few do.
See, e.g., Archon Fung, DeliberativeDemocracy, Chicago Style: GrassrootsGovernance in Policingand
Public Education, in FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 129; Garrett, supra note 70, at 43; Tracey
Meares, Prayingfor Community Policing,90 CAL L. REv. 1593, 1604 (2002); Tracey L. Meares & Kelsi
Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1315, 1369 (2007); Julissa
Reynoso, The Impact of Identity Politics and Public Sector Reform on Organizing and the Practice of
Democracy, 37 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 149, 158 (2005); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, LearningFrom
Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515, 515 (2003); Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L.
REv. 953, 956 (1996). However, when these scholars analyze race, class and gender they rarely conclude
that social conflicts along race, class or gender lines can threaten the viability of collaborative
decision-making networks. An exception is Susan Sturm's and Lani Guinier's work on new governance
approaches to workplace inclusion and equity in higher education.
102. One early commentator did analyze HOPE VI's public-private collaborations as an example of
some of the accountability measures proposed in the privdtization literature generally. The commentator
rightly observed that "privatization produces an alignment of public- and private-sector interests that
renders ineffective the accountability mechanism proposed by the privatization literature." This
commentator, however, did not specifically analyze the affects of race, class or gender on collaboration.
See Note, When Hope Falls Short, supra note 11, at 1479. This Article expands upon that early work, by
focusing on the impact of race, class and gender dynamics on collaboration in Chicago's ten-year
experiment.
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marginalized groups in social reform. 10 3 Recognizing this weakness in new
governance scholarship, Professor William Simon concedes that new governance
scholarship "calls out" for two additional types of socio-legal analysis: first,
"implementation studies," in which scholars study the efficacy of a regime's
current practices in vindicating its articulated goals; 1 " and second, a "power-

dynamics assessment," in which scholars would study:
[t]he gap, not between rule and circumstances, but between the parties'
collective articulated goals and their differing 'real interests' (in the sense
explicated by Steven Lukes in Power). So this would include an analysis of the
procedural structure of negotiation among the stakeholders, the bargaining
endowments in terms of both legal rules and cultural or economic resources,
and then the psychologicalprocess of interaction, etc. Here, we are interested

in the contrast between the collectively articulated goals of the system and what
intuits as the real interests of the individual sub-constituencies of
the researcher
10 5
the system.
This Article provides a "power dynamics assessment" of the complex
dynamics of race, class, and gender at play in Chicago's HOPE VI reform
process. Public housing reform and inner city urban redevelopment generally are
examples of regulatory reform under conditions of social conflict. Public housing
reform is plagued by more social conflict than an optimistic new governance
account may concede. While it does not advocate a complete return to previous
command and control approaches, this Article explores which new governance
approaches may enhance marginalized constituent's participation in HOPE VI
reform, and also proposes where a more formal public law framework may be
necessary.
F Power and the ProfitMotive: DemographicRepresentation, Opportunism
andAcquiescence

In his seminal work, "Power: A Radical View," Professor Steven Lukes
describes three important dimensions of the operation of power. 10 6 The onedimensional view is predicated upon the easily observed exercise of powerwhere one person with more power over takes the will of another and forces the
subordinated person to consciously do something he or she would not otherwise

103. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in
Transition, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (2003) (acknowledging that healthcare is not immune to deeply
rooted inequalities in American Society); see also discussion infra Part IV-B.
104. Handler et al., supra note 25, at 501.
105. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
106. See STEvEN LuKEs, POwER: A RADicAL ViEw 23 (2d ed. 2005); see also JOEL F HANDLER, DOWN
FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATTON AND EMPowERMENr 116-36 (1996) (describing
Steven Lukes' explanation of power and applying it to the operation of power in human service agencies).
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do. 107 Studies of this view of power focus on explicit human behavior, observable
08
conflicts and measurable policy preferences in decision-making.
The two-dimensional view of power is closely related to the first, but it focuses
not only on easily identifiable power struggles, but also on how power may more
subtly exclude and suppress key individuals, issues, and perspectives from the
decision-making agenda. 109 To study power at this level, a researcher must make
inferences about arguments, grievances, perspectives and individuals that are
subordinated in various social processes, rather than focus only on what can be
easily observed. 0
The third-dimension, which is the most difficult to identify and measure, does
not occur when there are clear formal conflicts or unexpressed grievances.
Rather, it occurs when the dominant subject begins, through narratives,
discourse, and other ideological and psychological processes, to determine the
subordinated object's wants, needs and desires." 1 This final dimension of power
is the most difficult to study because it requires studying the objective
sociological effects of hegemonic ideologies and also internal subjective
psychological processes."' Studying this third level of power is a methodological challenge, as the researcher must make inferences about the interests and
values of subordinated people that may not be clearly articulated or easily
measured.1 3 Yet, in modern poverty and urban reform efforts, power frequently
operates at this more structural, institutional and ideological third level, which is
the most difficult to measure empirically.
As the profit-motive and complex race, class and gender tensions increasingly
pervade urban reform, various reform agendas and narratives that further
ruling-class interests have emerged. Arguably, the mixed-income approach to
housing is one such narrative, as well as other discourses of social uplift, personal
responsibility, and self-sufficiency, amongst others. While these narratives can
justify reforms that lead to positive long-term changes for low-income and
traditionally marginalized constituents, they can also provide a normative
justification for regulatory reform efforts that privilege ruling-class interests.
Urban reform occurs against the backdrop of these multiple, shifting and
sometimes unstated reform agendas. These reform agendas operate on the
different levels of power described above.
This Article analyzes Chicago's public housing reform experiment along these
three levels of power. A power analysis of Chicago's reform experiment reveals
at least three limitations in new governance theory's account of stakeholder

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See HANDLER, supra note 106, at 116.
Seeid. at 117.
See id. at 118.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 130.
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collaboration in social reform. First, the new governance account of stakeholder
collaboration assumes that the "right" stakeholder-the one who will effectively
represent the long-term interests of marginalized stakeholders in such collaborations--can be easily identified. Second, even assuming that the right stakeholder
can be identified, new governance theorists rarely discuss how the increasingly
market-driven and public-private nature of such reform collaborations can create
incentives for stakeholder representatives to act opportunistically in contravention of their constituents' long-term interests. Finally, those same incentives can
lead well-meaning stakeholder representatives to unwittingly acquiesce in the
prevailing discourses that elevate ruling-class interests as the universal objectives
of urban and social reform.
The first problem of identifying the right stakeholder-the one whose behavior
and decision-making will advance the long-term interests of marginalized
constituents-operates at the first level of power. At this level, the first challenge
is for low-income minorities to identify the right person or institution whose
behavior will support policies that are in the best interests of the totality or at least
in their particular collective interest. Implicitly this stakeholder representative
must be willing to hold fast in the face of overt power conflicts. Thus, the
researcher who seeks to study power at this level must study the easily observed
behavior of stakeholder representatives throughout a development process.
The second problem of representative opportunism operates at both the first
and second levels of power. Here observers must simultaneously study both what
the stakeholder representative does and fails to do. The focus of the study should
be on the intentionally opportunistic behavior of the stakeholder representative as
well as omitted options and perspectives. The nature of the problem that the
stakeholder network must solve is defined, in part, by such omissions. 1 14 The
focus is on policy perspectives that might advance the interests of marginalized
stakeholders that the stakeholder representative fails to raise or turns away from
as the goal setting and decision-making process unfolds. The researcher's focus
here is on the "bottom up" perspectives that fail to appear on the problem-solving
agenda. This level of analysis is important, since simplistic understandings of
identity politics may give certain local decision-making processes the gloss of
representativeness and accountability, when, in fact, such processes do not lead to
outcomes that advance the long-term interests of marginalized constituents.
The problem of acquiescence operates at the third level of power and is, thus,
the most difficult to identify. Here, the researcher focuses .on the outcomes of the
decision-making process as well as the observable behavior of the stakeholder
representatives. If the outcomes do not further the long-term interests of the
stakeholder representatives' constituency, then the researcher must ask why. If

114. See generally WiLLiAMs, supra note 1, at 121 ("Blacks and women are the objects of a
constitutional omission that has been incorporated into a theory of neutrality. It is thus that omission
becomes a form of expression ... ").
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domination or opportunism does not provide an easy answer, then acquiescence
is a plausible alternative explanation. A researcher can identify acquiescence by
observing how stakeholder representatives frame and articulate the problem to be
solved. Acquiescence occurs when stakeholder representatives unwittingly
articulate their needs, and those of their constituents, in terms that reflect the
dominant narratives of urban reform, rather than demand concessions that will
lead to the long-term empowerment of their constituents. New governance
theory's construct of informal, but collaborative private-public stakeholder
participation does not sufficiently account for such dynamics and therefore
underestimates the need for formal public law approaches to guide and to hold
such collaborations accountable to public law values.
1. Demographic Representation
Historically, scholars and practitioners in the field of urban revitalization have
equated demographic representation with representative governance. As Professor Susan Bennett explains, lawyers working to empower traditionally marginalized communities often presume that they can gauge "representativeness" by
examining "the fit between the composition of an organization's leadership and
the demography of its neighborhood." 115 If the racial, gender, or socio-economic
characteristics of the elected or appointed tenant representatives are similar to the
characteristics of those they purport to represent, then scholars and practitioners
often presume that such representatives will sufficiently identify, and advocate
for, their constituents' interests.
Similarly, many new governance scholars highlight examples of social reform
in which organizations with low-income or minority representation participate.11 6 In such instances, scholars often presume that groups are "representative" because they have leaders of the same racial, ethnic or socio-economic
background as the relevant community. 117 While examples of adequate representation abound, there are also numerous contrary examples where such representatives do not advance long-term interests of their constituents. As class stratification
and complex identity politics become an increasing part of social reform, it is
equally probable that such representatives may feel allegiances to other
constituencies based upon competing identity characteristics.
It is important when analyzing new governance's informal reform collaborations to acknowledge this social complexity throughout the reform process. A

115. Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers'and Training
in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 469, 477 (2002) (noting that "researchers have taken great
care to distinguish 'substantive representation'-a similarity between an organization's and its
constituents' perception of the neighborhood's needs-from 'descriptive representation'-a similarity
between an organization's and its constituents' demographic and socio-economic characteristics").
116. See supra text accompanying note 70.
117. See Bennett, supra note 115, at 477.
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reform network may appear to be sufficiently representative at the outset because
certain representatives reflect the demographics of their communities. Yet, such
collaborations may need to be monitored to ascertain if the representative does in
fact advance the long-term interests of his or her constituents and to assess if the
network's decision-making leads to outcomes that reflect the long-term interests
of its purported constituency. Consequently, a representative that is not demographically aligned could possibly be a better representative.
2. Representative Opportunism
Second, even if a duly elected representative, who is both demographically and
ideologically representative of his or her constituent group, participates in new
governance reform collaborations, he or she can be easily influenced in such
informal public-private collaborations, motivated by both social and profitmaking goals. This is also the case with organizational representatives. The
likelihood that marginalized constituents' representatives will act opportunistically and pursue their own selfish ends increases as tenant representatives and
non-profit organizations collaborate with for-profit entities motivated by financial
returns. The incentives in such collaborations may encourage stakeholder
representatives to either intentionally, or unwittingly, fail to adequately represent
their constituents.
Corporate governance theory's concept of managerial opportunism is instructive. Managerial opportunism is the tendency of elected board representatives
and managers to abdicate their obligations to their constituents to pursue
self-interested profit-making ends. 11 8 Shareholders are considered the "owners"
of the firm since they have a residual interest in the profits of the firm. Yet, despite
their ownership claim, shareholders are not the decision-makers who control the
day-to-day operation of the firm.' 1 9 Instead, shareholders delegate this power to a
board of directors which then monitors the behavior of corporate officers, who
are responsible for the day to day decision-making of the firm.
This separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation creates a
principal-agent problem. 120 The shareholders are principals who delegate power
and authority to agents, the directors and managers. Within the scope of the
agency relationship, the directors and managers, have duties to act only in the
interests of their principals. Managerial opportunism occurs when the agent
managers consciously take advantage of their insider status, position, and access
118. See Amir N. Licht, ManagerialOpportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 22 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325 (2001).
119. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26 (describing that shareholders are the owners of the modem
corporation).
120. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
197-202 (rev. ed., 1967) (discussing a director's obligation to exercise "fidelity to the interests of the
corporation").
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to information to behave in ways that advance their own individual self-interests.
Thus, managerial opportunism undermines the principal's realization of his or her
goals and furthers only the agent's personal interests. Corporate governance
theory seeks to minimize managerial opportunism through
the establishment of
12 1
fiduciary duties and other forms of contractual control.
In the absence of formal legal or public law protections, there is an increased
likelihood that tenant representatives Or low-income board representatives will
consciously act opportunistically. Well-meaning and demographically aligned
representatives can be easily seduced by the enticements of those individual or
organizational network participants with more money, power or status. Such
stakeholders may receive informal enticements or incentives to pursue their own
self-interested ends such as guaranteed choice units in the new housing, choice
jobs, increased power and control within the housing complex, or increased
respect and status by housing authority officials or private developers.
Further, organizations are also prone to opportunism.12 2 Non-profit organization leaders are perceived to be indifferent to the profit-motive, since such
organizations are formed for broad public purposes and they cannot distribute
profits to their members or constituents in the form of dividends or distributions. 23 Yet, non-profits operating in a capitalist economy must make profits to
further their public ends. They are permitted to do so as long as those profits are
made in a manner consistent with the non-profit's public purposes and are not
24
distributed as dividends to the organizations' members, boards, or participants. 1
However, as non-profits increasingly engage in joint ventures with for-profit
organizations and form for-profit subsidiaries to finance their public purposes,
their representatives are increasingly exposed to the institutional rules, structures
and incentives of for-profit organizations. 125 They are increasingly inducted into
the professional norms and discourse of a for-profit culture. Under such
circumstances, the risk of co-optation is heightened. In such networks, non-profit
organizations or tenant representatives are often dependent upon the for-profit
participants for financial support as well as social capital. If such networks are
dominated by elite professionals, there are multiple incentives for lower income
representatives to pursue decisions that will bolster their individual status within

121. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value .of Securities Regulation, 28
CAwozo L. REv. 333, 359-60 (2006) (explaining that state corporate law creates fiduciary duties and
uniform codes of conduct to curb "managerial opportunism").
122. See HANDLER, supra note 106, at 20 ("As long as organizations have a choice (and most do), they
will favor those clients that will enhance legitimacy and garner or preserve resources ... ").
123. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals,The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and
For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.YL ScI. L. REV. 457, 458-59 (explaining that the classic
conception of the non-profit is based on the "non-distribution constraint" that forbids a non-profit from
distributing resources to its owners).
124. See id. at 459 n.8.
125. See generally MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JoINT-VENTURES INVOLVING TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1
(2d ed. 2000) (describing the participation of tax-exempt organizations in joint ventures with for-profit
entities).
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the network. As such, organizational representatives also have incentives to
protect their own interests, rather than those of their constituents. Without a
public law framework, representative opportunism in each case may go
unchecked. 126
3. Representative Acquiescence
Third, both individual and organizational stakeholder representatives may also
unwittingly act opportunistically. Chicago's original public housing residents are
overwhelmingly black, female and poor. 127 Historically, they have been vilified
in public discourse--constructed as lazy, undeserving, and prone to manipulating
public resources. 128 Such social constructions of public housing residents can
justify punitive legal and regulatory initiatives or efforts to decrease such
residents' presence in certain neighborhoods. In order to counteract such
narratives and improve their social status in the network, public housing resident
representatives may unintentionally acquiesce in decisions that further the
interests of the wealthier or more empowered stakeholders in the reform
collaborations. This risk is heightened if such resident representatives suffer from
information asymmetries regarding the technical complexities of urban redevelopment and HOPE VI reform.
Similarly, organizational representatives are not neutral actors within the social
world. As separate "persons" under the law, organizations obtain their power,
authority, legitimacy and longevity from the social frameworks in which they are
embedded.1 29 Although run by natural persons, organizations and institutions
also construct an identity of their own. 130 As Professor Joel Handler explains,
organizations depend upon their environments to obtain legitimacy, resources

126. But see Susan Helper et al., PragmaticCollaborations:Advancing Knowledge While Controlling
Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443, 471-75 (2000) (arguing that pragmatic collaborations
based on "learning by monitoring" both advance knowledge and control opportunism and thus align
interests between the collaborators).
127. See ROBERTA M.

FELDMAN & SUSAN STALL, THE DIGNITY OF RESISTANCE: WOMEN RESIDENTS'

ACIVISM IN CHICAGO PUBLIC HOUSING 19 (2004) (describing the feminization of poverty in public
housing by explaining that "[a]lthough the first public housing leaseholders were overwhelmingly
male-headed families, in Chicago public housing, in 1991 85% of the families listed a woman as the
primary leaseholder [and] by 1997, the percentage was up to 94%") (citations omitted). This trend is also
true of HOPE VI reform, generally. See generally Danielle Pelfrey Duryea, Note and Comment,
Gendering the Gentrification of Public Housing: HOPE VI's Disparate Impact on Lowest-Income
Afican American Women, 13 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 567, 582 (2006) (explaining that "the

statistical predominance of African American woman-headed households in HOPE VI target sites
strongly suggests that those who have suffered the brunt of the program's acknowledged shortcomings
are extremely poor African American women").
128. See RHONDA Y WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HOUSING: BLACK WOMEN'S STRUGGLES

AGAINST URBAN INEQUALITY 128 (2004) ("[B]lack women who sought low-income assistance became
repositories of deviance.")
129. HANDLER, supra note 106, at 20.

130. Id.
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and power. 13 To the extent that other organizations within a problem-solving
network are profit-motivated or elite-dominated institutions, organizations purported to represent the interests of marginalized constituents may also inadvertently acquiesce in discourses and decisions that favor the more empowered
132
actors in the network.
As Part II reveals there is evidence that such power dynamics did occur in the
local decision-making collaborations that implemented HOPE VI reform in
Chicago. These dynamics illustrate a classic accountability problem for new
governance's informal public-private collaborations. The Chicago example
suggests that the participation of elected tenant representatives and non-profit
organizations with community based boards in new governance collaborations
must be evaluated throughout the redevelopment process. Additionally, it
suggests that there must be adequate safeguards to protect organizational and
individual network participants who represent the minority view. If organizational participants who strive to represent the minority viewpoint are consistently
outvoted, or if their contributions are summarily dismissed, then new governance
must provide some formalized protections for such participants.
II. HOPE VI As

NEW GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION
AND POWER

A. Hope VI as New Governance
HOPE VI is now in its seventeenth year of implementation in cities across the
country.1 33 While the efficacy of HOPE VI as a strategy for public housing
reform is the subject of continued scholarly debate, 134 HOPE VI reform in

131. Id.
132. Id. at 21.
133. In 1992, Congress first passed the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program amendments to
the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, known as the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere Programs Act
of October 6, 1992. Whereas most legislation is simultaneously authorized and appropriated by
Congress, HOPE VI initially operated through appropriations only. In the 1992 amendments, Congress
appropriated the first $300 million dollars for the program through a FY1992 Notice of Funding
Availability (NOFA), published in the Federal Register. As such, HUD administered grants under the
program through each fiscal year's notices of funding availability (NOFA) and individual Grant
Agreements rather than through formal regulation. Later, HOPE VI was authorized by Congress for the
first time, when the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 repealed the October 6, 1992
legislation and further amended Section 24 of the Housing Act of 1937. Most provisions of the Public
Housing Reform Act were incorporated into the FY 1999 NOFA. The subsequent FY 2000 NOFA
incorporated all provisions of the authorization. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI
PROGRAM Autoarry AND FUNDING HISTORY (2007), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/
programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf.
134. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 11; Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, Response, HOPE VI: A Vital
Tool for Comprehensive NeighborhoodRevitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 527 (2001);
Lynn E. Cunningham, supra note 97, at 353; Megan Glasheen & Casius Pealer, Continuing the
Conversationwith Policy Makers: A Review of the Brookings InstitutionReport on HOPE VI, 15-FALL J.
AFFORDABLE HousNG & CommuNtvY DEv. L. 104 (2005); Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?:
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general, and Chicago's Plan in particular, reflects new governance trends. HOPE
VI reform epitomizes devolution, decentralization, privatization, informality and
stakeholder collaboration. First, initial federal HOPE VI grant authorizations
embraced devolution and decentralization by removing rigid mandates that
impeded local public housing authorities' ("PHAs") discretion in the development of revitalization goals. Under the Clinton Administration, HUD suspended
the federal one-for-one replacement rule that previously guided all public
housing redevelopment and modernization. 135 This former federal rule required
public housing agencies to develop a replacement unit for each demolished
public housing unit. Suspending this requirement enabled local PHAs to "tear
down projects without having to replace demolished 'hard units' with an
equivalent number of new public housing units." 1 36 Rather, displaced residents
could be offered a voucher to use in the private housing market.1 37 Thus, through
federal deregulation, local PHAs gained more flexibility and discretion to
determine the number of public housing units in each mixed-income public
housing redevelopment.
Second, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 ("QHWRA"), formalized and further expanded HOPE VI's initial innovations. It
eliminated admissions preferences for the lowest income families and expanded
the ability of PHAs to evict tenants and to conduct criminal background checks
on prospective tenants. 138 Through QHWRA, the federal government also
formally changed its role in public housing provision. HUD transformed from
public housing steward to incentive creator.1 39 In this new model, federal
agencies such as HUD and the IRS govern from a distance; at the most, they
outline very broad goals and create incentives to bring together a network of local
private and public stakeholders who will collaborate and experiment in an effort
Community Economic Development andLocalism, 35 CONN. L. REv. 385 (2003); Harry J. Wexler, HOPE
VI: Market Means/Public Ends-The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban
Revitalization DemonstrationProgram, 10-SpG J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 195
(2001); Sean Zielenbach, Catalyzing Community Development: HOPEVI and NeighborhoodRevitalization, 13-FALL J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 40 (2003); Sean Zielenbach, The HOPEVI
Elderly DemonstrationProgramafter Five Years, 13-FALL J. AFFORDABLE HousING & COMMUNITY DEV.

L. 81 (2003); Note, When Hope Falls Short, supra note 11; Duryea, supra note 127; Michael S.
Fitzpatrick, Note, A Disasterin Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD 's Newest Big Budget
Development Plan, 7 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 421 (2000); Herbert R. Giorgio, Jr., Comment,
HUD's Obligation to "Affirmatively Further"FairHousing:A CloserLook At HOPE VI, 25 ST. Louis U.

PuB. L. REV. 183 (2006); Dana L. Miller, Comment, HOPE VI and Titie VIII: How a Justifying
Government Purposecan Overcome the DisparateImpact Problem,47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1277 (2003).
135. See Smith, supra note 8, at 35 (explaining the enactment of the 1995 Recessions Act, which
suspended the one-for-one replacement rule).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 36.
139. See Yan Zhang & Gretchen Weismann, Public Housing'sCinderella:Policy Dynamics of HOPE
VI in the Mid-1990s, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING

PUBLIc HousING

COMMUNiTiEs, supra note 2, at 41, 59 (mentioning that HUD emphasized the devolution of control from
the federal government to local PHAs).
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to implement broad reforms.
The mixed-income approach to public housing reform exemplifies this trend as
QHWRA identifies mixed-income as a goal, but gives local PHAs substantial
latitude to implement mixed-income reforms. 140 The broad objective of mixedincome housing is to expose very-low and low-income residents to higherincome households in order to stem the social dysfunction that has historically
plagued very low-income public housing. 141 Advocates of the mixed-income
approach seek to simultaneously de-concentrate the poverty of public housing
residents as well as to mitigate the racial142segregation and class isolation that
many public housing residents experience.
Third, Congress embraced privatization approaches in QHWRA. The legislation authorizes the use of public housing development funds and operating
subsidies for projects owned by private entities. 14 3 It also provides public
subsidies to create incentives for private investors to invest in public housing
reform. 14 4 Fourth, consistent with new governance theory's penchant for
informality, flexibility and experimentation, HUD did not develop rigid regulatory standards to implement HOPE VI. 1 4 5 Rather, yearly notices of funding
availability ("NOFAs"), individual grant agreements, and in a few cases legal
opinions and consent decrees, formed the legal obligations and requirements of
the program. 146 These slightly more flexible sources could be more easily revised
and updated in response to future information and change.
Lastly, HOPE VI reforms provide opportunities for third-sector private or
non-profit institutions and public housing residents to participate in reform.
Public housing residents can form resident management corporations to bid and
to assume certain management responsibilities from the CHA. 147 Ten percent of
HOPE VI's grants are to be used for services to residents such as job training and
placement, day care, and substance-abuse counseling. 148 These services are often
performed by non-profit organizations that contain low-income and minority

140. See infra Part II Section Cl.
141. See Janet L. Smith, Mixed Income Communities: Designing Out Poverty or Pushing Out the
Poor?,in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LivE? TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES, supra note
2, at 259, 260; see also Michael Schill, Chicago'sNew Mixed Income Communities Strategy: The Future
of Public Housing, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES 151
(William Van Vilet ed., 1997).
142. See Cara Hendrickson, RacialDesegregationand Income Deconcentrationin Public Housing, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35, 81 (2002) (explaining that HUD's income deconcentration rules
attempt to address the problem of racial segregation by using income as a proxy for race).
143. See The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 539, 112
Stat. 2594-95 (amending the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-7 (2000)); see also
Poindexter, supra note 24, at 660.
144. See supratext accompanying note 143.
145. See Zhang & Weismann, supra note 139, at 46; see also Note, When Hope Falls Short,supra note
11, at 1486.
146. See Zhang & Weismann, supra note 139, at 46.
147. See SIMON, supranote 82, at 23 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 964.120-50).
148. See SIMON, supra note 82, at 23.
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board members. These regulatory reform initiatives reflect a federal policy to
create partnerships between, residents, management, community organizations,
or enterprises. 149 While public-private collaboration is a stated goal of HOPE VI,
"meaningful resident participation" in local goal-setting and decision-making is
difficult to enforce, in part because Department of Housing and Urban
Development funding guidelines do not clearly define "meaningful". 1 50 Furthermore, participation objectives are only reflected in grant agreements executed
between a PHA and HUD, or in general notices of funding availability, not in
formal legislation. 51 Residents are only third-party beneficiaries of such
agreements and therefore cannot easily sue to enforce such rights in court.'5 2
While Section 18 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 still requires that HUD
disapprove any PHAs application for demolition or rehabilitation that is not
developed in consultation with residents and resident advisory boards, this
requirement can be easily met in form, but not in substance. 153 A PHA can easily
comply by establishing resident advisory councils and presenting preformed
plans to resident representatives. While such measures enable PHAs to comply,
they do not ensure that residents meaningfully participate in revitalization
decision-making.
Moreover, when residents attempt to enforce their "group right" to participation in federal courts, defendants routinely assert that residents cannot enforce
such rights. While Section 18 of the U.S. Housing Act seemingly provides a clear
private right of action to enforce residents' rights to participation, defendants
increasingly argue that such a mandate does not create a legally enforceable
private right of action. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the
circumstances under which a private right of action can be implied in Section
1983 to enforce federal statutes and regulations. 154 Residents have to expend
increasing time and money to assert this right in light of new Supreme Court

149. Id. at 22.
150. See Poindexter, supra note 24, at 660.
151. See Note, When Hope FallsShort, supra note 11, at 1492.
152. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FY 2000 HOPE VI REVITALizATION GRANT
AGREEMENT, Art. XI (B)(I)&(2), available at http://www.hud.gov/utilities/intercept.cfm?/offices/pihl
programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/00/fyOOrev.grantagreement.pdf ("(1) providing substantial opportunities for affected residents to provide input, advice, counsel, recommendations, and opinions as the
Grantee plans and carries but its revitalization efforts; [and] (2) providing reasonable resources, as
approved by HUD, for technical assistance, training, and capacity building to prepare affected residents
to participate meaningfully in the planning and implementation of the Grantee's revitalization efforts");
see also Note, When Hope FallsShort, supra note 11, at 1485.
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2) (1994).
154. The U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no private right of action for individuals to file a
lawsuit for disparate impact discrimination pursuant to the implementing regulations of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) ("Statutes that focus on
the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer
rights on a particular class of persons.") (citations omitted); see also Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283
(2002) ("We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred
right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.").
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opinions.1
New governance theory suggests that, despite such difficulties, the broad goal
of resident participation can be effectively implemented through "empowered
participatory governance". Advocates of collaborative, but empowered participatory governance assume that public housing residents will be adequately
represented through a representative governance structure. Empowered stakeholder collaboration, therefore, is the primary mechanism through which
residents are to hold private interests and public agencies accountable in HOPE
VI reform. A robust and collaborative conception of stakeholder participation in
new governance reform networks thus justifies regulatory approaches such as
devolution, decentralization, privatization and informality. However, an examination of Chicago's implementation process reveals that the majority of residents
did not "meaningfully participate" in the key decision-making processes of
HOPE VI reform.
B. Chicago's "Planfor Transformation"
Chicago's Plan officially began in January of 2000 with an initial HOPE VI
grant to the CHA in the amount of $1.5 billion dollars over 10 years. 156 The
massive scope of the Plan requires significant private sector investment and
involvement. At its initial launch, the Plan required at least $3 billion dollars of
additional private sector investment.1 57 Chicago's initial HOPE VI grant also
provided the impetus for a much larger effort to transform Chicago's downtown
and inner-city core to help reposition Chicago as a global metropolis. 158 In fact,
promises of a revitalized downtown and South Side figured prominently in
Chicago's recent bid to host the 2016 Olympics.' 59 The United States Olympic
Committee selected Chicago as the American competitor to host the 2016

155. See Wallace v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 298 F. Supp. 2d 710, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) and applicable HUD regulations created duty for city housing authority to act
affirmatively to further fair housing which was subject to private enforcement under § 1983).
156. The Plan was initially published in draft form for public comment on September 30, 1999. Yet,
the final version of the Plan was released on January 6, 2000 and approved by HUD in February of 2000.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 94. But see William Wilen & Rajesh D. Nayak, Relocated Public Housing
Residents Have Little Hope of Returning: Work Requirements for Mixed-Income Public Housing
Developments, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LivE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES,
supra note 2, at 216, 217 (arguing that while the Plan was officially launched in 2000, it began as early as
1996, when HUD temporarily took control of the CHA).
157. See Smith, supra note 2, at 93.
158. See Larry Bennett, Downtown Restructuring and Public Housing in Contemporary Chicago:
Fashioninga Better World Class City, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIvE: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC

HOUSING COMMUNITIES, supra note 2, at 282, 286; see also Ryan Chittum, In Inner-City Chicago,
'Metropolis'Hopesto Rise, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2007, at B 1 & B8 (exemplifying Chicago's commercial
redevelopment).

159. See Greg Hinz, USOC Picks Chicagofor 2016 Olympic Bid, CHICAGOBUsINESS.COM, April 14,
2007, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id= 24588&bt= Olympic +Bid&arc =n&
searchType=all.
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-Summer Olympics.'

60

If ultimately selected, Chicago proposes to hold the
opening ceremonies in a newly built temporary stadium in Washington Park, a
South Side park near the site of the once infamous, and now redeveloped, Robert
Taylor Homes public housing development.'
Like HUD, CHA also transformed its role in public housing provision from an
owner to an incentive creator. As Professor Janet L. Smith explains, "[a]s laid out
in the original 'Plan for Transformation,' the CHA no longer positions itself as a
housing provider, but rather now is a 'facilitator' of housing." 162 Prior to creation
of the Plan, CHA owned over 20 large multi-family public housing developments
163
and an even larger number of senior properties in inner-city neighborhoods.
Now CHA only owns the land under the new mixed-income developments; it
does not own the buildings or other improvements on the land. The new
mixed-income developments are owned by private developers who lease the land
under the developments from CHA under a 99-year ground lease for one dollar
per year.164
Chicago's "Plan for Transformation" is designed to revitalize Chicago's public
housing stock through a combination of demolition, new construction, and
existing public housing revitalization. 165 Yet, the Plan's success hinges on the
efficacy of the mixed-income approach to public housing reform. Under the Plan,
CHA seeks to rebuild or refurbish 25,000 housing units. 31% of the 25,000 unit
goal will consist of refurbished public housing units in new mixed-income
developments. 166 "Each mixed-income development will consist of roughly
equal numbers of public housing units, affordable units subsidized by the
low-income housing tax credit program, and unsubsidized market-rate units,
although the precise mix of units varies by development." 167 Thus, the Plan
encourages renters and owners of different socio-economic, racial and cultural
backgrounds to live with and to collaborate with one another.
The mixed-income approach also requires considerable public-private stakeholder collaboration. There are numerous examples of stakeholder collaboration
in Chicago's Plan. Chicago's participation in HUD's Moving to Work Demonstra-

160. Id.
161. Brian Louis, Chicago's Olympic Dreams Rest on Rehab Over Truck Parking Lot, BLOOMBERG.
COM, June 12, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aclXclf2QjEE&
refer=us.
162. Smith, supra note 2, at 119.
163. See Cn. Hous. AuTH., supra note 4, at 2.
164. See Grotto et al.,
Public Housing Limbo, C-. TRm., July 6, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-cha-main-sunday-bd-6-juO6,0,2989588.story.
165. RITA A. FRY, INDEPENDENT MONITOR'S REPORT To THE CH-.Hous. AuTH. AND THE CENTRAL
ADVISORY COUNCIL REGARDING YEAR 8 OF THE CHA PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION 4 (2007).
166. See id. at 4.
167. See Wilen & Nayak, supra note 156, at 230 n.5.
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tion Project ("MTW") is one example. 168 The MTW is another federal
demonstration program authorized by the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions Act
of 1996.169 The MTW's creation overlapped with the federal enactment of HOPE
VI reforms. The MTW is designed to "offer PHAs the opportunity to design and
test innovative, locally-designed housing and self-sufficiency strategies for
low-income families by allowing exemptions from existing public housing and
tenant-based Housing Choice Voucher rules."17 MTW program encourages
public housing residents to work and to develop other self-sufficiency skills. The
CHA cites the MTW as its source for imposing work requirements on public
housing residents. 171 In 2000, CHA applied for an MTW grant so it could more
flexibly implement the Plan for Transformation. 172 HUD granted CHA participation in the MTW program. The MTW is the impetus for many of the
public-private collaborations in Chicago's Plan. The MTW also led CHA and
private developers to collaborate with other non-profit organizations and
workforce development experts to devise programs to help residents fulfill the
work requirements of the MTW.
CHA's Service Connector Program is further evidence of stakeholder collaboration. Established in 2001, the Service Connector program assists original public
housing residents transitioning from public housing to temporary housing and
back to the mixed-income communities upon completion. 173 It also helps former
residents who choose to permanently relocate into the private housing market
with a housing choice voucher. 174 In Chicago, several non-profit organizations
with low-income membership or board representation often contract with private
such as job training, substance abuse counseling
developers to provide services
1 75
or work readiness programs.
Despite Chicago's efforts to facilitate collaboration in public housing reform,
its Plan unfolds against the backdrop of mounting power conflicts. While
proponents of the Plan maintain that the Plan has helped to improve neighbor76
hoods and transform the lives of many of Chicago's public housing residents,1
168. CHI.Hous. AUTH., FY 2006 MOVING To WORK ANNUAL REPORT, at inside back cover, available
at http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/fy2006-mtw-collaborations2.pdf (includes a list of public
and private organizations with whom CHA collaborates).
169. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Moving to Work (MTW) Background and Purpose,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/mtwlbackground.cfm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (citing
Pub. Law. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, dated Apr. 26, 1996).
170. Id.
171. See Wilen & Nayak, supra note 156, at 221.
172. See id. at218.
173. See CIt. Hous. AuTH., FY2008 MTW ANNuAL PLAN - PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION YEAR 9, at 85,
available at http://www.thecha.orgltransformplan/files/6MTW_030108.pdf.
174. See id. at 86 ("CHA announced that in FY 2008 the former the Service Connector Program will
be replaced with a new program called family works that will focus primarily on housing choice and
workforce development.").
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Daniel Levin, Op-Ed., Reversing Disinvestment in Vital Neighborhoods,CI. Tam., Jul.
19, 2008, at 23 (Chairman of Habitat Co. arguing that Chicago's Plan is successfully reversing 50 years of
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some of the evidence to date does not fully support these claims. Many residents
have been displaced from their original homes with no hope of returning to the
new developments upon completion. 177 While some displacement of public
housing residents was by design, at present, at least 56,000 remain on the waiting
list to enter undeveloped public housing units. 178 At the same time, growing
numbers of working, middle- and upper-middle class residents are moving into
former public housing neighborhoods in mixed-income developments. Why
diddidn't resident participation in Chicago's reform Plan not result in a more
equitable distribution of the benefits of reform? As the following sections show,
social fissures along, race, class and gender lines, insufficient funding, and
inadequate public protections, all coalesced to subordinate residents' needs.
C. Identity Politics: What's Race, Class and Gender Got To Do With It?1 79

Complex race, class and gender dynamics continue to be among the greatest
obstacles to successful public housing reform in Chicago. Chicago's .public
housing population is overwhelmingly black, female and poor. 180 As such, public
housing residents experience multiple and intersecting forms of structural and
social oppression as well as intentional animus. 8 1 This Section reviews the past
and present of public housing reform in Chicago to illustrate how the intersecting
oppressions of race, class and gender have shaped various ideologies and reform
agendas in Chicago's public housing reform saga. It also it describes public
housing reformers' gradual move away from formal law toward informal

disinvestment in Chicago's vital neighborhoods); Toni Preckwinkle, Op-Ed., Neighborhood Progress,
Cm. TRIB., Jul. 19, 2008, at 23 (Chicago alderman arguing that Chicago's Plan contributes to
neighborhood progress in North-Kenwood-Oakland); Lewis A. Jordan, Op-Ed., Meeting Challenges,
CHI. Tm., July 19, 2008, at 23 (CEO of the CHA arguing that the Plan is successful meeting the myriad
challenges of public housing reform). But see Grotto et al., supra note 164, at 4.
177. Sudhir Venkatesh, Breaking Promises at the CHA; Many New CHA Units Not Going to Ex
Residents, CHI. TRIB, Jul. 3, 2007, at 15 (describing that two-thirds of CHA families on the waiting list are
finding that their applications to live in the revitalized housing are being denied).
178. See Grotto et al., supra note 164, at 2.
179. This heading was inspired by Tina Turner's famous song and by David Wilkins' characterization
of this question at Wisconsin Law School's New Legal Realism Symposium. See Howard Erlanger et al.,
Forward:Is it Time for a New Legal Realism, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 335, 351 (David Wilkins remarked,
"[a]nd, then, the third question is what I like to call the Tina Turner question, which is: what's race got to
do with it, got to do with it-or why is studying race in the legal profession an important lens?").
180. See Feldman.& Stall, supra note 127, at 19 (noting that in 1991 85% of the families in Chicago's
public housing stock listed a black woman as the primary leaseholder); see.also W. David Koeninger, A
Room of One's Own and Five Hundred Pounds Becomes a Piece of Paper and Get A Job: Evaluatin,
Changes in PublicHousing Policyfrom a Feminist Perspective, 16 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 445.448
(1997) (citing Complaint, Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96 C 6949
(N.D. Il1. Oct. 25, 1996), at 14 [hereinafter Complaint] (alleging that at the time sixty-three percent of the
residents of the Cabrini-Green housing development in Chicago were female)).
181. See, e.g., Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing Home: A Re-Analysis of Gender Homeownership, and
Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 491 n.476 (2008)
(explaining the extensive literature on the "feminization of poverty").

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XVI

public-private stakeholder collaborations to mitigate race, class and gender
inequities in public housing administration.
Historically, class action public impact-litigation was the primary legal
mechanism used by public housing reformers to achieve widespread public
housing reforms.18 2 For example, litigation was used to combat the Chicago
Housing Authority's history of building public housing units in racially
segregated and impoverished areas. During the 1950s and 60s, "[o]f the 33
projects constructed only one was located in an area less than eighty-four percent
black, and all but seven were located in a census tracts that were at least
ninety-five percent black."' 1 83 This situation prompted a class of AfricanAmerican plaintiffs to sue CHA for its intentional segregation policies in a
lawsuit, called Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth. 1 84 The Plaintiffs sued CHA under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and then the Fair Housing Act, for intentional
discrimination in public housing. 185 A federal district judge found CHA liable for
intentional discrimination and issued a judgment order forbidding CHA from
constructing any additional public housing in predominately black neighborhoods unless it also built public housing elsewhere. 186 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that HUD was also liable and that together HUD and CHA should
metropolitan area to remediate their past
work throughout the entire Chicago
87
'
discrimination.
racial
of
histories
That decision paved the way for a widespread program of race-based
remediation in Chicago's public housing program. Black public housing residents were given Section 8 housing vouchers to move to suburban areas that were
at least 70 percent white and had "low concentrations of minorities".' 8 8 It also led
to a scattered-site program to build additional public housing throughout
Chicago. 189 However, the scattered-site program was thwarted by Chicago's
complex racial and class politics. CHA was an arm of the first Mayor Richard J.
Daley's administration and run by white administrators beholden to the Mayor
and his predominately white constituency.1 90 Those white constituents gave Not
in My Backyard ("NIMBY-ism") responses to the prospect of a public housing

182. See Lisa T. Alexander, supra note 56, at 155, 156 (2008) (describing the history of class-action
public housing litigation addressing racial discrimination in Chicago). Gender was also an intersecting
form of oppression in these cases as the class members were overwhelmingly poor, black women. See
Complaint, supra note 180, at 14.
183. See Hendrickson, supra note 142, at 45.
184. Gautreaux.v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Il. 1969).
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Hills v. Gautreaux,425 U.S. 284 (1976).
188. See Hendrickson, supra note 142, at 58.

189. Id.
190. See Feldman & Stall, supra note 127, at 51 ("From the early 1960's, CHAs executive director
was a "crony" of the then mayor, Richard J. Daley.").
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presence in their neighborhoods.' 91 Additionally, many black leaders argued that
the Gautreaux Consent Decree led to a reduction in federal dollars for new
housing in black communities. 1 92 This resistance led CHA to produce little to no
new public housing in Chicago
from 1969 until 1981, when the Gautreaux
1 93
Consent Decree was revised.
As with other instances of traditional public impact litigation and remediation,
mounting frustration with the difficulties of implementing a widespread racebased remediation plan caused policymakers to turn towards more class-based
solutions for urban reform. In 1981, for example, the GautreauxPlaintiffs agreed
and Judge Aspen ruled under the Gautreaux Consent Decree that new public
housing could be built in what were considered "revitalizing areas."' 9 4 "Revitalizing areas" include areas that have: "a substantial minority population and are
undergoing sufficient redevelopment to justify the assumption that these areas
will be more integrated in a relatively short time.'' 195 As such, instead of requiring
CHA to build in predominately white areas to foster integration, the new ruling
allowed scattered-site public housing units to be built in primarily Black and
Latino areas with an increasing Black and Latino middle-class.
Some housing reformers, many of whom were black, viewed the de-centering
of race-based approaches to ameliorate poverty as a potentially powerful viable
alternative to the less successful integration-focused remedies that previously
guided public housing reform. The switch from race-based to class-based
remediation also coincided with emergence of the neoliberal approach to urban
community development. 196 The neoliberal approach reduced federal government funding and stewardship of social programs, and replaced it with tax
incentives and public-private partnerships as the primary mechanisms of social
reform. '97 Neoliberals also moved away from litigation-based strategies for

191. See Alexander, supra note 56, at 157 (describing the NIMBY responses to CHA's efforts to build
scattered site units in predominately white neighborhoods).
192. See Polikoff Combats 'Residential Apartheid' With Gautreaux, Sacrifices Inner-City Shelter
Needs For Open Housing Goal, CHI. REP., Mar. 1978, available at http://www.howardfairhousing.org/
civil-rightsschool/125/507/ (summarizing black leaders' criticisms of the remedial stage of the
Gautreaux case).
193. See William P.Wilen & Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and Chicago'sPublic Housing Crisis: The
Conflict Between Achieving Integration and Providing Decent Housingfor Very Low-Income AfricanAmericans, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNrrIEs, supra

note 2, at 239, 245.
194. See MARY PATrHLLO, BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLMCS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY

184-185 (2007).
195. Id. at 185 (citing Gautreauxv. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Il.1981)).
196. See Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development As ProgressivePolitics: TowardsA
GrassrootsMovement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399, 421-422 (2001) (explaining that the
Clintonian neoliberal policiespolices of the late 1980s and early 1990s shifted anti-poverty programs
towards market-based strategies).
197. See id.
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social reform and towards more transaction-based legal strategies for reform.19 8
These more contractual and deal-based approaches are reliant on public-private
collaborations to balance private and public goals. While the neoliberal approach
to community development signaled a policy shift towards privatization,
devolution and decentralization, it also reflected the age-old norms of self-help
and community self-determination that particularly resonated with the growing
black middle-class. 199
At the same time, during the 1980s, both the color and nature of the City's
political leadership began to change. After a brief respite from the first Daley
administration, Harold Washington was elected as Chicago's first black mayor in
1983.20 In contrast to the approach of the former Daley administration,
Washington embraced new strategies to include neighborhood groups, residents,
and non-profit organizations in redevelopment processes.2 °1 In 1984, he issued
his Chicago Works Together: Chicago Development Plan 1984, which embraced
an equitable approach to redevelopment and explicitly promoted enhanced
public-private collaboration and public participation in redevelopment decisionmaking.2 °2 As Washington endeavored to implement his plan, conflicts between
various constituents in Chicago ensued and Washington's efforts at reform were
ultimately cut short in 1987, when he died in office.2 °3 He was replaced by acting
mayor Eugene Sawyer (1987-1989), who then lost in the subsequent election to
Richard M. Daley, the former Mayor Daley's son.2 °4
Although whites reassumed power in the mayoral slot, Washington's administration paved the way for the growing black middle-class to secure several
aldermanic and administrative positions in City government as well as leadership
positions in institutions central to urban reform. Washington's administration also
signified the beginning of the emergence of what sociologist Mary Pattillo has
termed "black middlemen and black middlewomen. ' ' 20 5 As Professor Pattillo
explains, these actors are "brokers" within the public and private networks that
now dominate urban reform. 20 6 "They exist within a system of coalition politics
198. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, After Public Interest Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1251,
1285 (2006) (reviewing JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FiGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005)) (explaining that community economic development lawyering focuses on designing publicprivate partnerships to build affordable housing, create jobs, and increase services in low-income
communities).
199. See Cummings, supra note 196, at 399 ("Premised on the idea that poor neighborhoods are
underutilized markets in need of private sector investment, market-based CED gained a broad range of
ideological adherents, resonating with proponents of black nationalism, neoliberal economics and

postmodern micropolitics.").
200. See GREGORY D. SQUIRES,

CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES iN BLACK AND WHrrE: THE INTERSECTIONS
OF RACE, CLASS AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 113 (1994).

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See PATTILLO, supra note 194, at 235.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 18.
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that fosters and requires both finesse and subterfuge in the back and forth
translation of the demands of various interest groups. ' 20 7 The emergence of black
middlemen and middlewomen also coincided with a growing skepticism of
traditional impact litigation as the most useful mechanism to achieve racial and
social justice.
The growing presence of black middlemen and middlewomen and the return of
upper middle-class whites and blacks to the inner-city have substantially changed
the power dynamics of inner-city revitalization.20 8 Many members of the black
middle-class are now stewards of urban reform as leaders, managers, officers and
employees of the various public and private institutions that now direct urban
revitalization.2 0 9 Because of their race, such stewards may be perceived as
representatives of black public housing residents' interests. The presence of
demographically similar managers and agents may legitimate the network's
regulatory decisions in the eyes of policymakers and scholars, even though the
stewards are not elected and they may approve decisions that will not advance the
long term interests of their constituents.
The private or profit-motivated participants in the network can also create
formal and informal incentives, such as increased reputational, social, or financial
capital, which encourage the representatives to act opportunistically. The
question of whose interests these actors represent becomes quite complex, as
class stratification amongst blacks becomes an increasing reality.2 10 Chicago also
seeks to entice upper-income residents back to the inner-city to ensure its
transformation process.21 As such, social tensions around class, race, and
ethnicity are heightened in Chicago's inner-city.212 Since a majority of public
housing households are headed by single black women, gender dynamics are also

207. Id.
208. Id. at 121.
209. Vincent Lane and Terry Peterson, both black males, were Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of the
CHA. See Chi Hous, Auth., Officials of the Chicago Housing Authority: From the Time of its Inception in
1937 (March 26, 2008), http://www.thecha.org/aboutus/files/ListCommissionersback_1937.pdf; see
also ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., CHICAGO HOUSING AuTHoRrry TNMLINE DEC. 1986 - AUG. 1998, at 2 (1998),
available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/D19980404.pdf. On July 7, 1999, Sharon Gist
Gilliam, a black female, was appointed by Mayor Richard M. Daley as the Commissioner of the CHA.
See Chi Hous, Auth., About Us - Sharon Gist Gilliam, http://www.thecha.org/aboutus/sharon-gist-gilliam.
html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). Lewis A. Jordan, a black male, and a former Chicago public housing
resident, is now CEO of the CHA. See Chi Hous, Auth., About Us-Executive Team, http://
www.thecha.org/aboutus/executiveteam.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). Since 1994, Renee Glover
Lewis, another black woman, has served as the CEO of the Atlanta Housing Authority. See AtI. Hous.
Auth., About Us--Our President and CEO, http://www.atlantahousing.org/profile/index.cfmfuseaction=
ceo (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
210. See PATrtLLO, supra note 194, at 118.
211. Antonio Olivo, Downtown Chicago Tops Urban Living, CHI. Tm., Nov. 15, 2005, at 7
(explaining that Chicago's downtown market leads the country in a widespread revival of residential
urban centers); see also Audrey McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence, and the Obligations of the Police Power 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 8 (2006) (describing
municipalities' "quest for the upper-middle class resident").
212. See Reed, supra note 16, at 12.
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an undeniable part of the transformation of public housing communities. 13 Thus,
it is more unclear than ever that there is a unified black presence in the inner-city.
This increasingly complex social stratification presents significant challenges
for new governance theory's optimistic vision of collaborative stakeholder
participation in social reform. New governance theory and praxis must sufficiently engage this social complexity in order to determine how best to balance
traditional "hard law" and "soft law" approaches to produce beneficial outcomes
for traditionally marginalized stakeholders. Sections Cl and C2 of this Part,
examine two local goal-setting and decision-making processes in Chicago's
HOPE VI reform experiment; namely, (1) the birth of the mixed-income norm in
Chicago; and (2) the creation of site-based resident screening criteria at each
redevelopment. Both processes reveal how race, class, and gender dynamics
operated "on the ground" to obscure conflicting interests, to conceal distributive
inequities and to undermine effective participation and collaboration. These
examples show that empowered stakeholder collaboration can be easily undermined in increasingly informal, privatized and decentralized decision-making
networks. These dynamics force new governance scholars to reconsider the role
of "hard law" in local public-private stakeholder collaborations.
1. The Birth of the Mixed-Income Norm: Demographic Representation
The birth of the mixed-income norm illustrates these social tensions. The
mixed-income approach to public housing reform coincided with the emergence
of the black middlemen and middlewomen and the ascent of the public-private
partnership. The mixed-income norm emerged from informal public-private
stakeholder collaborations. It is, thus, an example of norm-generation in such
collaborations. The emergence of the mixed-income norm reveals the limits of
demographic representation and the problems of representative opportunism and
acquiescence in stakeholder collaborations motivated by profit-making goals.
In 1988, Mayor Eugene Sawyer appointed Vincent Lane, a prominent member
of the black middle-class as Executive Director of the CHA. 1 4 Lane continued as
Executive Director under Mayor Richard M. Daley's administration, the son of
former Mayor Richard J. Daley. Lane grew up in public housing, but he rose to
prominence as a private real estate developer with experience in developing
subsidized housing projects. 2 15 He was also a former member of one of Chicago's
influential policy and planning non-profits, the Metropolitan Planning Council
("MPC"). Lane had an earnest commitment to public housing reform and he
sought to improve CHA's tarnished reputation through programs that would
improve the quality of life of public housing residents in Chicago.
Between 1988 and 1991, Lane lobbied HUD to provide financing for his
213. See supra text accompanying note 180.
214. See Smith, supra note 8, at 7.
215. See PATrtLLO, supra note 194, at 230.
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Mixed-Income New Communities Strategy ("MINCS"). 2 1 6 MINCS was a
demonstration program with the goal to rehabilitate existing public housing units
in two high rises into mixed-income communities and to acquire new units in
low-density mixed-income areas.2 17 These objectives reflected Lane's belief, and
a philosophy that was gaining currency amongst the black middle-class and other
policymakers, that one of the major flaws in public housing was the intense
concentration of poor residents in the developments.2 18
This shift towards income de-concentration as the solution to public housing's
problems reflected black Professor William Julius Wilson's sociological theories
about the cultural and behavioral causes of urban poverty and social dysfunci also a prominent member of the black middle class. In The
tion. 219 Wilson is
Truly Disadvantaged,Wilson argued that one of the primary causes of poverty
and social dysfunction in Chicago's inner city was the exodus of the black
middle- and working-class from the inner-city. 220 This group's departure
allegedly increased the "social pathologies" of the urban underclass, due to a lack
of alternative positive role-models. 221 The premise of the mixed-income
objective is that poor people are more likely to improve their social condition and
their behavior through exposure to higher income households. While this
argument may have some validity, it is predicated on primarily cultural and
behavioral explanations for social problems that are also partly structural and
institutional. The mixed-income narrative privileges discourses of social dysfunction as the root cause of continued poverty.
This theory gained significant currency amongst housing and community
development reformers and the growing black middle class, as it seemed to
explain the notoriously problematic social dynamics in Chicago's public housing
developments. As such, Lane lobbied to include funding for the demonstration
project in the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.222 Lane ultimately
received funding from HUD for his demonstration project. Lake Parc Place
("Lake Parc") was the pilot project for the program and it proved to be a success
when completed in 1991.223 Higher income families were living next to public
housing residents. "A survey of residents found that nearly 80 percent of all
families were satisfied or very satisfied with the development., 224 Public housing

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id. at239.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 99.
PATLLO, supra note 194, at 239.
See Zhang & Weismann, supra note 139, at 46.
See PATTILLO, supra note 194, at 106.
See id. at 107.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 99.
See id.
Id. at 100.
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residents appreciated the reductions in crime, amongst other benefits.22 5 Fewer
public housing residents were displaced by the redevelopment at Lake Parc Place
than in the ensuing "Plan for Transformation." Half of the units at Lake Parc were
reserved for low-income families and the other half were for moderate-income
families.2 26 However, the income mix and unit configuration used in Lake Parc
Place differed substantially from that used in Chicago's Plan for Transformation.
All residents in Lake Parc Place were renters and there were no market rate
tenants.2 27
On the local level, however, the success of Lake Parc Place prompted a shift in
approach to public housing reform in Chicago. Between 1991 and 1994, an
informal but diverse network of prominent stakeholders convened to formulate a
new city-wide strategy. 228 The network consisted of "Alexander Polikoff, lead
counsel for the Gautreaux plaintiffs; George Ranney, board member of the
University of Chicago, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Metropolitan
Planning Council; University of Chicago Vice President, Jonathan Kleinbard;
and CHA executive director, Vincent Lane. '229 The group also included other
prominent black policy reformers and developers such as Allison Davis, a
well-known black developer, 230 and Valerie Jarrett, an appointed commissioner
of the City Department of Planning and Development and a member of a
prominent black family in Chicago.2 3 '

225. Id. But see Hendrickson, supra note 142, at 76 (explaining that moderate-income tenants at Lake
Parc Place had a higher turnover rate than low-income tenants and that no study confirmed interaction
between residents of different income classes).
226. "Half of the 282 apartments [at Lake Parc Place] [were] designated for, and ... marketed to,
families with one employed adult and earning between 50 and 80 percent of median income (between
$21,700 and $34,700 for a family of four in 1992) ....The other 141 apartments were set aside for very
low income tenants ... earning less than 50 percent of the median income. Former residents [of public
housing] had first call on these units." James E Rosenbaum et al., Lake Parc Place: A Study of Low
Income Housing, 9 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 703, 705-706 (1998).
227. Id.
228. See PATrILLO, supra note 194, at 239-40.
229. Id.
230. Allison Davis is a powerful black real estate developer with close ties to City Hall. See Grotto et
al., supra note 164, at 2. Davis grew up in Hyde Park and was educated at some of Chicago's finest
schools, including the Chicago Lab School, the Hyde Park High School and Northwestern Law School.
See Tim Novack, How City Hall Critic Became a Cozy Insider, CHI. SuN. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2001, at A14,
availableat http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/644511 ,CST-NWS-davis 11 .article#. He returned to
Chicago in 1967 and began working at the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council, a progressive
planning agency. Id. He was also a member of the progressive Chicago Council of Lawyers and became a
partner at a small, but powerful firm, Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland. Id. Davis switched from
primarily litigation work to transactional work as a lawyer on community development projects in
Chicago. Subsequently, he began to receive various local political appointments, first from Mayor Harold
Washington, and then from Mayor Richard M. Daley, who appointed Davis to the Chicago Plan
Commission. Allison Davis is now a major developer and property manager in Chicago's Plan. Most
recently, he has been criticized for his involvement in Chicago's Plan for Transformation. Id.
231. See Jody Kantor, The New Team: Valerie Jarrett, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/O6jarrett.html. Valerie Jarrett was Co-Chair of the Obama
Transition Team. Id. She was also chosen by President Obama as a White House Senior Advisor and
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Notably, this informal network included few, if any, tenant representatives and
their meetings were not open to public review. 232 Yet, they did consist of some
black middle- or upper-middle class professionals with social clout and technical
knowledge about subsidized housing development. Such representatives were
likely understood to be "working in the interests of the residents."2 33 While many
of these reformers might have had "the best interests of public housing residents
in mind," many may have also had conflicting interests and affiliations. The
group devised extensive development plans for the area which focused on
demolishing existing public housing to make way for new mixed-income
communities.23 4 Lane did not serve long enough to spearhead his dream of local
and national mixed-income reform. In May 1995, he was found guilty of
mismanagement and the control of CHA was returned to HUD from 1995 to
1999.235

This saga reveals the shifting interplay of race and class in Chicago during this
time. It also shows the retreat from formal law *toachieve public housing reforms.
It shows how class-stratification in the black community complicates the utility
of demographic representation. Further, it demonstrates that some black middlemen and middlewomen do engage in representative opportunism in informal
public-private stakeholder collaborations. Lane's eventual ouster as Executive
Director of the CHA for financial improprieties suggests that he was guilty of
opportunism. 2 36 Initially, when Lane was appointed Executive director of CHA,
Lane was in favor of rehabilitating existing public housing units to expand, rather
than to diminish housing opportunities for public housing residents.2 3 7 Yet, as
time progressed, Lane became a staunch advocate for the mixed-income

Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations and Public Liaison. Id. Ms. Jarrett has been a
stalwart supporter and confidant of President Obama. Id. She is also an African-American of high social
pedigree who has been well respected in local Chicago politics for decades. Id. Her great-grandfather was
the first black person to graduate from M.I.T. Id. Her grandfather was the first black man to head the
Chicago Housing Authority and her father was the first black resident at St. Lukes Hospital. Id. Prior to
her involvement with the Obama Campaign, Ms. Jarrett served as Chief Executive of Chicago's famous
Habitat Company., a private real estate development company headquartered in Chicago that was the
court appointed receiver for the CHAs scattered-site remedial program ordered under the Gautreaux
consent decree. See id; see also PAMrILLO, supra note 194, at 240. While the Habitat Company has been
criticized by some advocates for its management of some CHA projects, Valerie Jarrett has not been
accused of any mismanagement or self-dealing. See Kantor, supra. She is also a well-intentioned
advocate of beneficial public housing reform. See id.
232. See PATrLLO, supra note 194, at 239.
233. See id. at 240 (noting that Jarrett explained that these working group members "came without
portfolio, but wanted to be helpful").
234. See id. at 241. Predominately white public housing reformers outside of Chicago also expressed
enthusiasm and optimism regarding the mixed-income approach to public housing reform that was later
enshrined in HOPE VI legislation.
235. See Bennett, supra note 11, at 7.
236. Vincent Lane's resignation came after CHA personnel misappropriated $15.3 million dollars of
CHA Pension assets and $4.3 million in health insurance payments. Millions of dollars were also
mismanaged through fraudulent actions by outside vendors. See Smith, supra note 2, at 97 n.23.
237. See PATrILLO, supra note 194, at 236.
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approach, even if it led to a significant reduction in the supply of housing for
public housing residents.2 38 Lane's shift in position-favoring the demolition of
public housing units versus rehabilitation-also shows the negative effects of
profit-oriented public-private collaborations on even well-meaning, demographically aligned, representatives.
Lane's shift also evidences the power of narratives which justify reforms that
privilege ruling-class interests. The mixed-income narrative framed reform
through public-private partnerships as necessary for resident empowerment. Yet,
Lane's vision for public housing reform also reflected the narratives of social
uplift, personal responsibility, and income de-concentration, often invoked by
the black middlemen and black middlewomen, as well as neoliberals and
conservatives. Yet, these "middlemen" are not necessarily disinterested or
unbiased actors in urban reform. 2 39 As Pattillo explains, their fate is both distinct
from, but linked to, that of poorer black public housing residents.2 4 ° The black
middlemen and middlewomen benefitedbenefitted from urban revitalization
programs in monetary and non-monetary ways. 241 This reality increases the
possibility of such actors exercising representative or managerial opportunism, as
agents of public housing residents' interests.
The story of the birth of the mixed-income approach also shows institutional
and organizational acquiescence. While the "concentration effect" premise of
mixed-income reform has some validity as a sociological theory, the mixedincome mantra became a hegemonic narrative in urban reform that shielded
.Chicago's Plan from otherwise rational critiques 242 The pursuit of the mixedincome objective in Chicago shifted the focus of implementation strategies away
from the needs and desires articulated by public housing residents towards what
was considered necessary to appease private investors and to attract working and
upper-middle class buyers. Institutional actors participating in the Plan for
Transformation, such as the CHA itself, local policy and planning non-profits
such as the Metropolitan Planning Council ("MPC"), non-profit legal institutions
such as Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI), and
private developers such as the Habitat Company, all began to construct a

238. Id.
239. See id. at 122.
240. See id. (describing "linked fate").
241. Given his experience as a developer, Allison Davis plays a significant role in Chicago's Plan.
Davis is the primary developer for Stateway Gardens, a once infamous Chicago public housing
development that is being redeveloped as a mixed-income community called Park Boulevard. See Grotto
et al., supra note 164, at 2.
242. I remember my own experiences as a black middlewoman in Chicago litigating a case against
CHA regarding aspects of Chicago's Plan. It became difficult to even articulate in public discourse,
particularly in black middle class circles, a rational critique of the Plan's implementation. Most contrary
arguments and evidence were constructed as an effort to derail progress for public housing residents
themselves. Notably, the only arguments that resonated with the black middle class stewards were
arguments that CHA's failed relocation plan directed displaced residents to predominately black working
and middle-class neighborhoods, thereby destabilizing such neighborhoods.
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narrative about mixed income reform that shielded the approach from significant
critiques.2 43
One example the privileging of private interests is the reduction of public
housing units proposed under Chicago's Plan. From it's inception Chicago's Plan
was designed to reduce the total number of public housing units in the City of
Chicago from about 38,000 to 25,000.2' Arguably, the mixed-income objective
could have been achieved even if 38,000 public housing units were dispersed
throughout all the new mixed-income developments. But both insufficient HOPE
VI funding and a desire to reduce the total public housing stock in the city were
factors that likely led CHA to reduce the total number of units rebuilt under the
Plan.
Further, demolition outpaced redevelopment and the Plan is significantly
behind schedule. Initially, CHA predicted that 25,000 new or rehabilitated public
housing units would be completed by fiscal year ("FY") 2009.245 In FY 2007, the
CHA completed approximately 64.8% (16,202 units) of its 25,000 unit goal.24 6
CHA projected that it would complete another 1,008 units by the end of FY2008
representing approximately 68.8% of the total goal.2" 7 A recent Chicago Tribune
investigation found that almost nine years into the projected 10 year program
only 30 percent of the mixed-income redevelopments have been rebuilt. 248 While
CHA predicted that the Plan would be completed by 2015, some insiders now
project that the Plan may not be completed until 2025, due in large measure to the
recent downturn in the housing market. 249 The disconnect between the pace of
demolition and the pace of rebuilding suggests that it was more important to clear
the inner-city landscape of the notorious and formerly blighted high-rises, and
pave the way for a re-definition of the inner-city, than to assure that former
residents could return to the new developments.
The evolution and implementation of the mixed-income policy reveals that it
did not emerge from the "bottom up". Mixed-income was not necessarily a
solution to public housing woes articulated by public housing residents. In fact,

243. See, e.g., Kim Grimshaw Bolton, Response to Public Housing Limbo 7/6/2008 (July 17, 2008),
http://www.metroplanning.org/articleDetail.asp?objectlD=4456 (Metropolitan Planning Council responding to the Chicago Tribune's recent criticism of the Plan and arguing that at the outset of the Plan a group
of civic organizations pledged to promote the Plan's success); Levin, supra note 176 (arguing that a
recent spate of Chicago Tribune articles inaccurately describes the progress of Chicago's Plan and its
scattered site housing program); Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, BPI Public
Housing, http://www.bpichicago.org/ph.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (describing its support and
stewardship of the Plan).
244. See Smith, supra note 8, at 93.
245. See Cm. Hous. AuTH., supra note 4, at 2.
246. Sharon Gist Gilliam, Message From the Former CEO, in FY 2008 MOvING TO WORK ANNUAL
PLAN, PLAN TRANSFORMATION YEAR 9, at 1, 1 (Cm. Hous. AuT. ed., 2007), available at http://
www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/1Cover_030108.pdf.
247. Id.
248. See Grotto et al., supra note 164, at 1.
249. See id.
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the Central Advisory Council ("CAC"), a representative body composed of
elected tenant representatives from each Chicago public housing development,
alleged that it was not included in the initial goal-setting and development of the
Plan. Rather, the CAC was only asked to vote to approve the Plan after it was
fully developed by CHA. 250 Mixed-income, as the normative goal of HOPE VI
reform, was a concept initially brokered and implemented by "black middlemen"
representatives. It later came to be a central objective of national public housing
reform. Mixed-income was lauded by both black and white local and national
low-income housing reformers, as a solution to many of the long-standing
problems of public housing reform that seemed incapable of resolution. Yet, the
normative objective did not emerge from public housing residents themselves as
a solution to their woes. Rather, it was a "top down" formulation, with the cloak
of legitimacy, in part, because of the "black middlemen" and "black middlewomen" institutional representatives who were thought to represent the interests
of the overwhelmingly low-income black female population of public housing
residents.
While some residents have clearly benefited from mixed income reforms, the
mixed-income norm operates to reduce the available housing stock for former
public housing residents.25 ' The increasing presence of upper-middle class
whites and blacks in former public housing neighborhoods near Chicago's
downtown core is also changing the racial, ethnic, and socio-economic character
of those places.2 52 Mixed-income in Chicago, thus, contributes to the gentrification of former public housing neighborhoods and to the displacement of, rather
than the empowerment of many former residents.25 3 As such, informal local
public-private decision-making collaborations can subordinate residents' voices
and needs.
2. Site-Based Resident Screening Criteria: Representative Opportunism and
Acquiescence
In contrast to the birth of the mixed-income norm, public housing residents and
250. See Smith, supra note 2, at 116 ("As one CAC member said, from the beginning we should have
been there at the table.") (citations omitted).
251. "In the first three quarters of FY2007, there was a 12.86% decrease in the total number of units
available for occupancy in the CHA's housing stock, given that units were taken offline for revitalization
or demolition activity. This decrease resulted in a fewer number of occupied units, as well as a fewer
number of residents." See CHI. Hous. AutH., MOVING To WORK FY2007 ANNUAL REPORT, app. at 144
(2008), available at http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/reports.html; see also NAT'L Hous. LAW
PROJEcT, FALSE HOPE, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that through HOPE VI and related redevelopment
activities "the country is facing a net loss of 107,000 public housing units through demolition").
252. "The changes in the racial and ethnic make up of residents in family housing consisted primarily
of an increase in the number of White, Native/Alaskan, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Hispanic residents.
There was a 7.49% decrease in the number of Black residents." See Cn. Hous. Autm., supra note 251, at
144.
253. See Glasheen & Pealer, supra note 134, at 106 (finding that Chicago's Plan sparked most of the
nearly $1.6 billion in real estate transactions in the surrounding area since the plan began in 2000).
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their elected representatives were undeniably involved in the public-private
networks that developed site-based resident selection criteria. As previously
explained, Chicago's redevelopments are mixed-income, containing units reserved for very low-income, low to moderate- income residents, and market-rate
residents. Prospective homeowners in the new mixed-income developments are
subject to virtually no rules or regulations, largely to entice market-rate
homeowners to buy into Chicago's mixed-income redevelopments. However, all
prospective and returning renters in Chicago's new mixed-income redevelopments must meet certain tenant screening and eligibility criteria. 4 Public
housing residents are primarily returning renters at each mixed-income redevelopment.
In order to qualify for occupancy in the new mixed-income redevelopments,
all prospective and returning renters must meet two separate sets of criteria: the
requirements of the Minimum Tenant Selection Plan (MTSP) devised by CHA,
as well as the local and site-based resident screening criteria are established by
private developers at each redevelopment site.2 5 5 In general, site-based criteria
are "simply standards, rules or tests that property managers use to assess any
resident (public housing, affordable or market rate) interested in moving into the
new development". 6 As CHA further explains, "[t]hese criteria often include
credit history, criminal background checks, drug testing, housekeeping or home
visits, and7 an evaluation of a resident's employment or self-sufficiency
record.,

25

The CHA devises the MTSP and its criteria apply to all of the redevelopments
in the Plan for Transformation.2 58 MTSP includes minimum hours of employment, credit history and financial standing requirements, residential history,
criminal background checks, and mandatory school attendance for all young
children in the household.25 9 CHA sited the MTW program and the associated
Relocation Rights Contract (RRC) as sources of authority for the development of
a work requirement as part of the MTSP. 260 Each private developer of a
254. See Wilen & Nayak, Work Requirements, supra note 156, at 232 n.29 (explaining that CHA's
Minimum Tenant Selection Plan (MTSP) issued on September 21, 2004 specified that all renters whether
market rate, low-income or very low-income had to meet the MTSP, but homeowners who tend to be
market rate are not subject to such criteria).
255. Id.
256. See Chi. Hous. Auth., Understanding Residency Requirements, http://www.thecha.org/relocation/
residencyrequirements.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
257. Id.
258. See Chi. Hous. Auth., Minimum Tenant Selection Plan For Mixed-Income/Mixed Finance
Communities, http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/DocumentE_010208.pdf (last visited Apr. 27,
2009).
259. Id.
260. See Wilen & Nayak, Work Requirements, supra note 156, at 220-221. As a condition of its MTW
grant, however, CHA had to execute a legally enforceable Relocation Rights Contract with all families
residing in CHA housing as of October 1, 1999. Id. at 218. This contract provides all residents in public
housing on or after October 1, 1999 a legally enforceable right to return to the redevelopments upon
completion; yet residents must also meet the MTSP and site-based criteria, Id. at 220.
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mixed-income public housing redevelopment must adopt the MTSP prior to
closing on the financing for the new developments.2 6 1 CHA mandates that the
MTSP should be equally applied to all applicants and that the developer must
comply with all federal, state and local civil rights laws when applying the
criteria.262 Although CHA has always had admission and occupancy requirements for public housing residents, the site-based Tenant Selection Plans ("TSP")
contain standards developed by private owners and developers at each site. Thus,
the site-based TSPs are different at each of Chicago's multiple mixed-income
redevelopments.
CHA residents generally participate in the determination of the TSP through
their Local Advisory Council ("LAC") representatives. 26 3 LAC members are
public housing resident representatives elected by residents at each development
every three years. Each LAC president is then given a seat on CHA's Central
Advisory Council (CAC), which makes implementation recommendations to
CHA.2 4 The LAC representatives participate in the local public-private decisionmaking networks that devise the TSPs at each mixed-income development. Once
the draft version of the site-based TSP is developed, the CHA hosts a public
comment hearing and conducts a 30 day public comment period. Subsequently,
the policies and the comments are submitted to the CHA Board for approval.
Thus, the TSPs are a form of self-regulation generated through public-private
collaborations. While there is some public oversight of the process of generating
site-based criteria,26 5 the criteria are not published and best practices that
empower residents are rarely identified.
Initial studies of site-based criteria at various Chicago redevelopments reveal
that some TSPs are draconian or at least may include criteria that will be very
difficult for public housing residents to meet.2 66 Some TSPs give property
managers the ability to reject families that have declared bankruptcies more than
two years prior to applying.2 67 Other sites preclude a resident from returning if
they have any debt delinquency greater than $1,000 dollars.2 68 At some sites, any

261. See Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 258, at 1.
262. See id.
263. See Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 251, at 10-11.
264. See Patricia A. Wright, Community Resistance to the Plan For Transformation: The History,
Evolution, Struggles and Accomplishments of the Coalition to Protect Public Housing, in WHERE ARE
POOR PEOPLE TO LVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLiC HOUSING CoMMuNrrTEs, supra note 2, at 125, 131.
265. According to CHA a working group is established that consists of public housing resident
leaders, the developer, CHA staff, community partners, the Habitat Company, the City of Chicago and
Gautreaux Plaintiff's Counsel. The working group consults with the developer to select a master
developer. A Master Development Agreement is created that must be approved by HUD and other
officials. The master developer is supposed to work in consultation with the working group to develop a
site-based Tenant Selection Plan (TSP). See Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 251, at 10-11.
266. See Raj Nayak & William Wilen, Relocated Public Housing Residents Face Little Hope of
Return: Work Requirementsfor Mixed-Income Public Housing Developments, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
515, 521 (2004).
267. See id. at 520-22.
268. See id.
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debt over 90 days past due could prevent an applicant from meeting the screening
requirements.2 6 9 Some tenant plans look at criminal history indefinitely with
regards to certain crimes. 27 Some tenant plans are silent as to whether a
conviction or merely an arrest is required to reject applicants.2 7 '
If returning residents cannot meet the site-based criteria, then they are
precluded from actually returning to the new developments, despite their formal
right to return under the RRC. 272 Families covered by the RRC are given one year
within which they can "work to meet" the criteria.27 3 They must receive social
services or engage in activities that will help them meet the criteria within one
year, but if they fail to successfully meet the criteria within one year they cannot
return to the redevelopments. While some residents themselves may want strict
tenant selection requirements, 7 4 many of the tenant selection criteria such as
credit histories, work records, and resident self-sufficiency records are likely
required to appease low-income housing tax credit investors and prospective
market rate home owners.
As discussed infra in Part III, the redevelopment processes at a few
mixed-income developments were judicially supervised via consent decrees.
Residents at those sites developed less stringent criteria. Representative opportunism and acquiescence may explain, in. part, why stakeholder collaborations free
of judicial supervision developed TSPs that may prevent former public housing
residents from returning to the redevelopments. Chicago's long history of
patronage politics can affect representation.27 5 Some residents argue that LAC
representatives are often closely aligned with CHA.27 6 For example, since LACs
were created in 1966 only one LAC has ever sued CHA and that was the LAC at

269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 258, at 1.
274. Residents, rightfully so, may favor strict criminal background checks given the history of crime
in public housing. See Kimberly E. O'Leary, Dialogue, Perspective and Point of View As Lawyering
Method, A New Approach to Evaluating Anti-Crime Measures in Subsidized Housing, 49 WASH. U. J.
URa. & CONTIMP. L. 133, 142 (1996) (explaining that in Chicago "5,000 public housing residents signed
a statement in favor of warrantless searches of their apartments for weapons"). Yet, some argue that even
public housing residents seek tempered crime control measures that "will not hurt their children and their
communities." See Tracey L. Meares & Dan Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated ProceduralThinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHl. L. FORUM. 197, 213 (describing the responses of
African-American residents living in Chicago's high crime neighborhoods to Chicago's gang loitering
ordinance). However, residents may be less concerned about past due debts and other financial related
criteria.
275. See generally Maureen A. Flanagan, Politics, in ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO,
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/989.htil (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (describing
Chicago's long and notorious history of patronage politics).
276. Feldman & Stall, supra note 127, at 119; see also, William P. Wilen, The Homer Model:
Successfully Redeveloping Public Housing, 1 NW J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 62, 84, available at http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/vl/nl/3/ (2006) (noting that many public advocates over the
years have noticed how the LAC leadership is closely aligned with the CHA).
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Cabrini-Green.2 77 Some residents complain that LACs lack real authority and are
rubber stamping machines.27 8 City jobs for CHA residents are often filtered
through the LAC. 279 The LAC can help to get needed repairs in units among other
benefits.2 8 ° Since LACs administer the resources given to them by the CHA,
LAC representatives have distinct incentives to align their interests with CHA,
the black middlemen and middlewomen, and other members of the public
housing reform network. The lack of public oversight or judicial enforcement
creates significant opportunities for resident representatives to act opportunistically.
Further, acquiescence is a greater danger. Black women public housing
residents have long struggled against negative stereotypes that construct them as
undeserving of the public subsidies designed to support them. As Roberta M.
Feldman and Susan Stall illustrated in the book, The Dignity of Resistance:
Women Residents' Activism in Chicago Public Housing, black women public
housing residents in Chicago have long resisted such constructions through
activism and participation in public housing struggles.28 1 Yet, even as black
women resist such narratives, public housing reform as new governance presents
new challenges for such women.
The shift from 1960s and 1970s style protest reform towards collaborative
stakeholder governance in urban revitalization has forced many working-class
and poor blacks to increasingly articulate their needs in the discourse of "social
uplift" and economic empowerment, frequently invoked by reformers and the
black middle class.282 As sociologists explain, these dynamics cause ambivalence
amongst public housing residents regarding the new revitalization initiatives that
are purported to be for their benefit. 283 In order to gain personal legitimacy, poor
people's representatives may be reluctant to suggest or to support criteria that
other private actors in the network view with hostility. Such dynamics create
incentives for public housing residents to articulate their needs in terms that
resonate with those of other institutional actors in the network in order to receive
funding, support, jobs, and attention to the problems of their neighborhoods.
Thus, poor tenant or non-profit board representatives may unwittingly acquiesce
in decisions designed to ultimately benefit elites. These power dynamics of race,
class and gender pose a challenge for public housing reform predicated on

277. See Cabrini Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 96 C 6949, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 625 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1997).
278. Wright, supra note 264, at 131.
279. See Larry Bennett et. al., A CriticalAnalysis of the ABLA Redevelopment Plan, in WHERE ARE
THE POOR PEOPLE TO LIvE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING CoMMuNrrms, supra note 2, at 185, 201
(explaining that many residents at one development feel personally obligated to their LAC representative
for apartments and jobs).
280. See id.
281. See Feldman & Stall, supra note 127, at 6.
282. See PATTILLO, supra note 194, at 109.
283. Id.
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informal representative networks.
Second, as public housing reform becomes increasingly professionalized,
black female tenant representatives must increasingly evaluate proposals from
for-profit and non-profit affordable housing developers, and meet with public
housing authority officers, non-profit and for-profit executives, and other service
providers. While many tenant activists are quite savvy, many need technical
assistance to increase their capacity to understand the myriad legal, accounting,
and business issues that public housing reform now entails. 284 In the absence of
funding for technical assistance, residents may concede to the will of the
majority, due to information asymmetries and other barriers to informed decision
making. Even savvy tenant representatives may be unable to present alternative
accountable development solutions in the absence of technical assistance.
Without proper assistance and public law supports, it may be difficult for
residents to participate as co-equals with other stakeholders in public-private
collaborations. Thus, public housing residents may not, in fact, "meaningfully
participate" in the local decision-making networks that implement HOPE VI, in
the absence of a public law consent decree or rights based-framework. These
realities may belie new governance scholars' assertions that participation is best
facilitated by primarily informal collaborative networks.
III. ACCOUNTABLE DEVELOPMENT

IN CHICAGO'S PUBLIC HOUSING REFORM PLAN

Two of Chicago's HOPE VI redevelopments, Henry Homer Homes ("Homer")
and Cabrini-Green ("Cabrini"), were governed by different redevelopment
processes. The struggles to reform Homer and Cabrini began before extensive
deregulation of public housing redevelopment and before the nadir of the
mixed-income norm and the public-private partnership. Consent decrees obtained to resolve litigation brought before Chicago's Plan was enacted required
that the public-private decision-making collaborations at Homer and Cabrini
follow more formal rules, specifically designed to protect the residents' interests.
A broader coalition of residents also participated in the development of the
Homer and Cabrini redevelopment Plans. While the LAC representatives were
part of the process, a broader working group, including other residents, Plaintiffs'
counsel, CHA administrators, city officials, amongst others, participated in the

284. For example, many of Chicago's mixed-income developments are financed with equity capital
obtained through the Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC"). Understanding the complex
regulatory structure of the LIHTC and the complex syndication process it entails is complicated for even
the average lawyer or law student. To competently participate in decision-making, residents must
navigate this complex system of rules. This shifts their focus from alternative accountable development
solutions toward understanding the technical complexities of the redevelopment process. See generally
Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of UrbanRedevelopment: A Critiqueand an Alternative, 19 J. OF URB.
Aii. 1, 9 (1997) (explaining that "[w]hen organizations led by the lower classes shift from advocacy to
service, they move from internal to external dependency which includes dependency on staff and
imposed leadership") (citation omitted).
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decision-making surrounding the redevelopment of Homer and Cabrini. Thus,
the local decision-making was not solely in the hands of LAC representatives,
black middlemen and middlewomen representatives, or CHA administrators.2 85
The stories that follow reveal that the Homer and Cabrini redevelopment
processes are examples of accountable development. Accountable development
is defined as a movement that seeks "to change city redevelopment practices
through more confrontational grassroots campaigns aimed at increasing community participation in the planning process and forcing local developers and
governmental officials to commit to redevelopment projects that are responsive
to the needs of low-income residents."2 86 The Homer and Cabrini redevelopment
processes, respectively, are both examples of grassroots organizing that led to
class action litigation to assert public housing residents' rights to participate in
redevelopment. While the lawsuits are examples of the traditional public-impact
litigation criticized by new governance scholars, the remedial process contained
both traditional "hard law" and "soft law" new governance elements. In fact, each
story demonstrates that residents were able to more effectively and meaningfully
participate in the public-private decision-making collaborations because of the
existence of more traditional public law protections. These examples suggest that
public law elements may be necessary for marginalized stakeholders to
effectively participate in new governance's public-private stakeholder collaborations.
A. Henry Homer Homes
Power struggles over the redevelopment of Henry Homer Homes began as
early as 1988, when Vincent Lane was appointed head of the CHA, and long
before CHA unveiled its Plan for Transformation.2 87 Homer was one of CHA's

285. CHA now lists "working groups" as one of the key elements to enhance resident participation in
the rehabilitation process. See Cm. Hous. AuTH., supra note 251, at 10. However, some advocates and
residents allege that the working groups at other redevelopments only consist of one or two resident
representatives. Apparently, no lawyers are involved. Advocates assert that CHA or other public officials
are usually the ultimate decision-makers in such groups. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 92.
286. Scott Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in the Figueroa
Corridor, 17 J. AFF. Hous. & Comm. DEv. L. 59, 59 (2007) (defining the term "accountable
development"); see also Shelia Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of UrbanRedevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1999, 2003 (2007) (discussing "the emergence of an
,accountable development' strand of activism within the CED movement."); Nona Liegeois & Malcolm
Carson, Accountable Development: Maximizing Community Benefits from Publicly Supported Development, 37 CLEARaNGHOUSE REv. 174, 176 (2003), availableat http://www.lafla.org/pdf/accountDevel.pdf.
Advocates have also coined a related concept called "equitable development." See Angela Glover
Blackwell, It Takes a Region, 31 FoRtoiAm URB. L. J. 1303, 1316 (2004) (defining "equitable
development" as an approach to development that is "grounded in community building and participation;
it embraces complexity and comprehensiveness and promotes inclusion through new strategies and
policies").
287. Bennett et al., Introduction,supra note 11, at 7-8.
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most notorious public housing developments. 88 In 1991, CHA claimed that
Homer was CHA's "most troubled development" and "one of the most distressed
public housing properties in the nation. ' '289 The substantially deteriorated
conditions at Homer led public housing residents to file suit. In 1991, a class of
plaintiffs consisting of a non-profit organization at Homer called Henry Homer
Mothers Guild, current tenants at the Homer development, and prospective
applicants for the Homer developments, filed a lawsuit entitled Henry Homer
Mothers Guild v. Chicago HousingAuthority.2 90 The suit alleged that, due to the
deteriorating conditions at Homer, CHA and HUD had effectively demolished
the Homer developments in violation of Section 1437 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000), by failing to maintain the
buildings. 291 In 1995, the Plaintiffs reached agreement on the terms of a consent
decree (the "Homer Decree").29 2 Thus, the HOPE VI redevelopment process at
Homer, now called West Haven Park, was governed by a consent decree which
required greater participation
of residents in interim decision-making than other
2 93
Plan.
Chicago's
in
sites
Specifically, the Homer Decree mandated the creation of a working group
called the Homer Residents' Committee (HRC). The HRC consisted of seven
elected building, block or area representatives as well as class counsel for the
Hornerplaintiffs.2 94 The Homer Decree required CHA, the private developer for
the Homer redevelopment, as well as the Homer Managing agent to reach
agreement with the HRC on all matters pertaining to the Homer redevelopment.29 5 If agreement could not be reached,
then the court or a. court appointed
2 96
mediator could work to resolve the dispute.
With respect to the site-based resident screening criteria, the HRC and other
residents were a critical part of developing the Homer criteria. The criteria were
listed in the Homer Decree. Initially, residents at Homer only had to meet five'
criteria: (1) the family must not voluntarily vacate their unit; (2) the family must
not be evicted pursuant to a court order; (3) the leaseholder must not be convicted
of any felony involving physical violence or crimes against property that
adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of other persons, or the misdemeanors of aggravated assault, unlawful use of a weapon, battery or criminal damage
288. Alex Kotlowitz's famous book, "There Are No Children Here," followed the lives of two young
boys living in Henry Homer. Henry Homer homes figured in the book as a dilapidated development at the
center of crime, drugs, violence and despair. See Alex Kotlowitz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (199 1).
289. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 68.
290. Complaint, Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 91 C 3116 (N.D. Ill. May 30,
1991); see also Wilen, supra note 276, at 68 n.24.
291. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 68 n 23.
292. Consent Decree, Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 91 C 3116, 5 (N.D. I11.
March 10, 1995).
293. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 69.
294. Wilen & Nayak, supra note 156, at 225.
295. Wilen, supra note 276, at 85.
296. Id.
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to property, (4) any household member must not be convicted of the above
felonies or misdemeanors unless the leaseholder agrees to exclude the convicted
household member from the household; and (5) the family must not refuse to
participate "in a family needs assessment" to determine the family's needs.2 97
Under the decree, CHA also agreed not to implement a "work requirement" to
screen out potential residents.2 9 8 Unsuccessful families were also allowed to
appeal their rejections to a unique grievance panel.2 99
In 1997, Homer Residents agreed to additional resident screening criteria such
as poor housekeeping and failure to attend a replacement housing orientation.3"'
Then in 2002, since the mixed-income developments receive equity capital
through Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), additional criteria were
added such as: grounds to seek a deferral if household income exceeded
applicable tax credit limits; or if admission would violate otherwise applicable
restrictions under
the various funding mechanisms used to finance Phase II of the
30 1
redevelopment.
Although the Homer plaintiffs did have to amend their criteria to respond to
private interests, the redevelopment process at Homer allowed more public
housing residents to participate in the goal-setting and decision-making aspects
of redevelopment, than at other sites. 30 2 "The residents were intimately involved
in the design process, by reviewing and approving the designs of the buildings. 3 °3 As William Wilen explains, "[a]t the Homer Annex, the architects met
every week with the residents during the rehabilitation process, and adopted
many resident suggestions concerning the design of the units, the size of the
rooms, the configuration of the apartment, and the location of laundry room
hook-ups."
For over ten years, the seven members of the Homer Residents Committee
(HRC) met on a monthly basis and at "special call" meetings as necessary, and
monthly, with other Homer tenant leaders, to determine the position of the HRC
on the various redevelopment matters. The positions taken by the HRC were
determined based on the observations and experiences of the HRC members
themselves, by input they received from Homer residents, and by information
provided to them from their counsel and the HRC's consultants, a city planner
and a structural engineer.
As Wilen further elaborates,

297. Id. at 83 n.68.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 84.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 77 (explaining that in November 2003 the U.S. Government Accountability Office studied
resident issues in 20 public housing redevelopments under HOPE VI and found that Homer Phase I had
the "highest level of resident participation in the redevelopment process").
303. Id. at 76.
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... [o]ccasionally the Homer court, or, under the Phase II order, the Homer
Mediator, John Schmidt, would ultimately have to resolve the issue when the
HRC and defendants could not reach agreement. But for the most part, the
redevelopment proceeded under the watchful eye of the HRC and through the
process of the HRC reaching agreement with CHA, the developer and Homer
management. 3 4

Thus, the threat of judicial intervention forced the developers and other
stakeholders to acknowledge and to incorporate the views of the residents. A
broader group of residents than merely the LAC representatives were also
included in the periodic decision-making regarding the redevelopment.
Individual families were also given legal redress. Families who applied to the
Homer rental units and received a rejection could appeal their rejections to a
unique grievance panel that consisted of representatives selected by both the
HRC and management.3 °5 Other redevelopments in Chicago's Plan did not have
such redress. Under the general MTSP grievance policy which applied to all
Chicago redevelopments under the Plan, only Chicago's administrative hearing
officers reviewed such decisions.3 °6
While the Homer redevelopment process emerged out of explicit conflict and
litigation, both real estate professionals and poverty law advocates have
identified the West Haven Park redevelopment as a model for public-private
collaboration.30 7 Additionally, because over half of the residents at West Haven
Park are former Homer residents, the private developers work with non-profit
and private case managers, job training centers, and housing placement
counselors to provide needed services to the residents.30 8 Lastly, fewer residents
Were displaced as a result of the redevelopment because the federal one for one
replacement rule was still in place when the Homer Decree was negotiated, and
the Homer Decree contained measures to better align the demolition of old units
with the construction of new units. The Homer example demonstrates that some
traditional public law elements enabled residents to participate in a manner that
better distributed the benefits of redevelopment amongst all parties than the

304. Id. at 77.
305. Wilen & Nayak, supra note 156, at 227.
306. Id.
307. The Chicago regional office of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation identified the West
Haven Park Redevelopment as the Outstanding For-Profit Neighborhood Real Estate Project of 2005. See
Jeanette Almada, Westhaven Park Developer Honoredfor Rental Project, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2005,
§16A, at 2. The award description notes that the for-profit developer "worked endlessly with all
stakeholders-resident groups, the CHA, two aldermen, the plaintiff's counsel and neighborhood
leaders-to shepherd this phase of development to completion. The results are superior." Chicago
Neighborhood Development Awards, 2005 Outstanding For-Profit Neighborhood Real Estate Project,
http://www.lisc-cnda.org/display.aspx?pointer=3660 (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). In August 2005,
Multifamily Executive magazine also awarded West Haven Park the "Grand" Project of the Year in the
Mixed Income Category. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 76 (citing Rachel Z. Azoff, 2005 Multifamily
Executive Award Winners, MuLTiFAMILY ExEcunvE, Nov. 15, 2005, at 50).
308. See Wilen, supra note 276, at 75-76.
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participation of residents at other sites.
B. Cabrini-Green
The Cabrini redevelopment process also demonstrates the benefits of public
law elements in stakeholder collaborations. Cabrini-Green was also known as
one of Chicago's worst public housing developments.3 °9 Unlike many of CHA's
other public housing developments, Cabrini-Green is located at the intersection
of two of Chicago's most affluent neighborhoods, the Gold Coast and Lincoln
Park. 31 ° Thus, as early as the 1970s, City planners identified Cabrini-Green as a
candidate for redevelopment. 31 1 Yet, Cabrini-Green's revitalization was not a
reality until 1993, when Vincent Lane, then head of CHA, worked with the
Cabrini-Green LAC to develop a revitalization plan for Cabrini-Green that would
empower residents.31 2
As a result of its activism, the Cabrini-Green LAC did participate in the
goal-setting aspects of the original plan. The revitalization plan became part of
Lane's application to HUD for an initial HOPE VI grant to revitalize a few of
Chicago's most distressed public housing residences. HUD granted CHA $50
million dollars for the revitalization effort.3 13 CHA was also required to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the Cabrini-Green LAC, which gave
the Cabrini-Green LAC an explicit right to participate in the redevelopment
process.3 14 Yet, Lane was ousted in 1995 before the original plan could be
implemented.
Later in 1995, when HUD temporarily took control of the CHA, HUD, the
City, CHA and other reformers met to develop the Near North Revitalization Plan
which included plans for the redevelopment of Cabrini-Green. 31 5 Yet, the CHA,
under the control of HUD, prevented members of the Cabrini-Green LAC from
attending the private planning meetings for the new Near North Redevlopment
Plan, despite the LAC's repeated requests. 316 In response, on October 24, 1996,
the Cabrini-Green LAC sued CHA under the Fair Housing Act, Title VI, and the
participation provisions of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, among other state

309. In 1992, a young 7 year old boy was shot down by gang fire while walking with his mother from
the development to the Jenner Elementary School across the street. See Don Terry, Even a Grade School
is No Refuge from Gun Fire,N.Y. TiMsEs, Oct. 17, 1992, at 16.
310. Many of Chicago's other public housing developments were extremely isolated from other viable
housing in the city. The Cabrini-Green site has always been close to Chicago's downtown core and its
most affluent neighborhoods. See Patricia A. Wright et al., The Case of Cabrini-Green,in WHERE ARE
POOR PEOPLE TO LivE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HousiNG CoMMuNrrTs, supranote 2, at 168.
311. In 1973, Cabrini-Green was targeted for redevelopment in the "Chicago 21 Plan". The city and a
group of downtown developers sought to revitalize Chicago's downtown area. See id.
312. See id. at 170.
313. See id. at 171.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id.
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claims.3 17 Specifically, the suit alleged that the redevelopment plans would
adversely affect African-American women because they are disproportionately
eligible for public housing, and it asserted that the Cabrini-Green LAC was
injured because it was denied participation in the planning process, as required by
the U.S. Housing Act, initial HOPE VI legislation and the MOA signed with the
Cabrini-LAC.3 18
After two years of negotiation, the parties settled and put in place a consent
decree (the "Cabrini Decree"). 31 9 The decree provided for the Cabrini-Green
LAC to be a partner in the development and gave the Cabrini-Green LAC a 51%
ownership stake in the general partnership that would own part of Cabrini's
redevelopment. 320 The requests for proposal ("RFP") for redevelopment gave
extra points to developers who maximized the Cabrini-Green LAC's participation.321 CHA was also required to form a "working group" consisting of the
CHA, the City, Gautreaux
Cabrini-Green LAC, a community representative,
322
Company.
Habitat
the
receiver,
the
and
counsel,
During 2001, the Cabrini LAC worked with CHA to create a lottery that would
give first preference to original families displaced from Cabrini. The CHA signed
an additional MOA with the Cabrini LAC.323 The additional MOA enabled the
residents to issue their own RFPs with the $400,000 dollars they received under
the Cabrini Decree in order to hire technical assistance consultants to guide the
Cabrini-LAC through the redevelopment process. 324 In 2004, the Cabrini-Green
tenants formed their own real estate development entity called "Cabrini-Green
New Beginnings., 3 25 The resident owned entity hired real-estate development
consultants from the Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and
Community Improvement at the University of Illinois Chicago.3 26 It also
engaged the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Transactional Legal Clinic at the University
of Chicago Law School to assist it in developing the legal capacity to create the
development entity and engage in development work.32 7
In 2006, the Cabrini-Green public-private collaboration closed on the financing to construct, Parkside of Old Town ("Parkside"), a mixed-income community
on the former Cabrini-Green North Extension site.328 Parkside is the only
mixed-income Cabrini-Green development in which former Cabrini-Green
residents are equity partners. Upon completion, Parkside of Old Town will
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See id. at 172-73.
See id. at 173.
See id. at 174.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 176-77.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
See Fry, supra note 165, at 26.
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contain a total of 226 public housing units, 146 affordable housing units, and 404
market rate units.32 9
The Cabrini-Green LAC played a critical role throughout the development
process. It helped generate more equitable site-based resident screening criteria.
Several times, through the Cabrini Decree, the Cabrini-Green LAC sought court
intervention to prevent the creation of site-based criteria that would be
disadvantageous to a majority of former Cabrini-Green residents. For example,
the Cabrini-LAC sought to compel CHA to "earmark funds for replacement
housing before the demolition of certain public housing buildings commenced
and [to] amend certain provisions of the privately developed Parkside Tenant
Selection Plan ("TSP") ... ,330 The original TSP devised by the private
developers required that families who have at least one adult who works at least
30 hours per week should occupy at least half of the public housing units in the
new development. 331 That TSP included an exemption for a household member
who elects to stay home to care for preschool children as long as one adult in the
house is working.3 32
The Cabrini-Green LAC members, with the assistance of counsel, asserted that
the TSP did not account for single heads of household. 333 Former Cabrini-Green
residents are overwhelmingly black female single heads of household.334 The
Cabrini-Green LAC asserted that this provision of the original TSP violated the
Fair Housing Act and the terms of the Cabrini Decree.33 5 Bargaining in the
shadow of the law, the Cabrini-LAC was able to push its private development
partners to exempt single heads of household from the 30 hour work requirement
336
in the TSP.
The Cabrini-LAC also sued to contest a provision in the Parkside lease stating
that a lease may be terminated if "[t]he resident or any authorized family member
is convicted of a felony., 337 The LAC argued that this provision violated federal
law governing public housing leases as well as the terms of the Cabrini
Decree.33 8 The court ruled that the provision should be redrafted to comply with
federal law and to only allow felony convictions related to "the safe and healthy
environment" of public housing.3 3 9 While critics of the Cabrini process contend

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See id.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 180.
See Fry, supra note 165, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 28-29.
Id.
Id.
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that frequent litigation substantially delayed the development process,3 4 ° an
Independent Monitor reporting to the CHA and the Central Advisory Council
identified the process at Cabrini-Green as "an example of how cooperation can
lead to improvements in the quality of public housing units and residents'
lives." 34 '
The redevelopment processes at Homer and Cabrini demonstrate that the
threat of judicial intervention to enforce their "group right" to participate in
development decision-making enabled the residents to develop criteria that made
it possible for a greater number of public housing residents to return to the new
mixed-income developments and to extract other long-term benefits. Thus,
traditional public law measures bolstered the negotiating position of the resident
representatives such that they could demand more accountable reforms.34 2
Yet, power rarely concedes without a fight. Recently, CHA moved to diminish
public housing residents' participation in mixed-income communities by dismantling LACs. "On February 28, 2008, CHA published for public comment a draft
34 3
of its Amended and Restated Moving to Work Agreement ("Proposed MTW")."
CHA's Proposed MTW requests further waivers from federal and state law,
including a waiver from the federal requirement that public housing authorities
recognize public housing residents' councils. 344 HUD's regulations require that
public housing authorities recognize and financially support public housing
resident councils. 34 5 Yet, CHA requests that HUD waive this federal requirement
with respect to all of CHA's mixed-finance communities.3 46
CHA argues that resident councils will further stigmatize public housing
residents in mixed-income communities by giving them a separate governing
body. 34 7 CHA contends that public housing residents living in mixed-income
communities can effectively "participate in the broader community-based

340. See Cory Oldweiler, Cabrini Changes Come All Too Slowly, Cm. REP., Aug. 27, 2007, at 3,
availableat http://www.chicagoreporter.conVindex.php/c/ over-Stories/d/Cabrini-Changes-ComeAll

TooSlowly.
341. See Fry, supra note 165, at 27.
342. Currently, it would be difficult for residents to obtain such consent decrees in court. Many of the
formal or implied rights asserted by public housing residents in the Homer and Cabrini Green lawsuits
no longer exist. For example, at the time that the Homer and Cabrini-Greencases were filed, the one for
one replacement rule was still in place. That rule required that for every unit of public housing that was
demolished a new unit should be rebuilt. See discussion supra Part II.A. As a result of the existence of the
one for one replacement rule, residents in the Homer and Cabrini-Greennegotiations were able to insist
that more than one-third of the units in the redevelopments should be reserved for public housing
residents.
343. Letter from Richard M. Wheelock & Stephanie Villinski, Attorneys At Law, Legal Assistance
Found. of Metro. Chi., to Chi. Hous. Auth. (Apr. 15, 2008), at 1 (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter
from Wheelock & Villinski] (providing comments on CHA's Proposed Amended and Restated Moving to
Work Agreement as counsel to the Central Advisory Council (CAC)).
344. Id.
345. See 24 C.F.R. § 964.18 (2008). See generally24 C.F.R. §§ 964.100-.150 (2008).
346. See Letter from Wheelock & Villinski, supra note 343, at 1.
347. See id. at 3.
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neighborhood organizations that serve the entire development".3 48 CHA's
request, if granted, will likely prevent former public housing residents from
participating in the governance structures at each mixed-income development.
By definition, most public housing residents are renters not owners in CHA's
mixed-income communities. Public housing residents, therefore, cannot vote to
elect representatives to participate in such associations. As an alternative, CHA
proposes to appoint a Mixed Finance Resident Ombudsman to solicit the
concerns of public housing families residing in CHAs mixed finance communities.34 9 While CHA's stated motivation is to protect public housing residents,
their request can also be viewed as an effort to disempower residents in light of
the Homer and Cabrini experiences.
C. Lessons From Chicago'sPublic Housing Reform Experiment
Chicago's HOPE VI public housing reform experiment illustrates the operation of power in urban reform. It provides many lessons about the limits of
stakeholder collaboration in a pure new governance regime. First, it demonstrates
that identifying the right stakeholder is a more difficult task than many staunch
new governance advocates may be willing to admit. The birth of the mixedincome norm shows that some black middle-class representatives were prone to
opportunism as they negotiated their various intersecting identities and affiliations with conflicting constituencies. 35 ° While Lane initially advocated for public
housing residents' long-term interests, over time he changed. He was seduced by
the mixed-income narrative and the enticements of profit-making entities. He was
ultimately susceptible to opportunism. Organizations and institutions that
long-fought for equity and racial justice also began to tout the mixed-income
mantra, even if it resulted in implementation decisions that did not advance the
long-term interests of public housing residents.
Second, the Chicago example also teaches that it was difficult for public
housing residents to "meaningfully participate" in Chicago's reform process in
the absence of rights-bearing rules, formal rights to participation, judicial
supervision or administrative recourse. The Homer and Cabrini examples show
that private actors in such networks did not generate responsive solutions to

348. See id. at 2-3.
349. See id. at 1.
350. Allison Davis, Chicago's famous black upper-middle class developer, was recently criticized for
his stewardship of the redevelopment of Stateway Gardens into the new mixed-income development,Park Boulevard. See Grotto et al., supra note 164, at 4. Allison Davis's son, Cullen Davis, is also
extensively involved in property management for many of Chicago's new mixed income developments.
Id. His firm Urban Property Advisors (UPA) is the official property manager for Stateway Gardens and
Park Boulevard, as well as the Cabrini-Green Rowhouses. Id. Cullen Davis also recently came under fire
for imposing "heavy-handed rules" that apply only to public housing residents at Park Boulevard and for
mismanagement at the Cabrini-Green Rowhouses, where a three-year-old boy was crushed to death by a
heavy iron gate that fell on him. Id.
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public housing residents' concerns, even though they were presented with
information about residents' needs. Residents were rarely respected until they
threatened litigation or court intervention. Third, residents who asserted formal
rights and obtained consent decrees were more able to participate in key
decisions throughout the development process. Assisted by lawyers and other
technical assistance providers, the public housing residents were able to press
their more profit-oriented collaborators to recognize and respect their needs. In
fact, residents and their representatives were empowered, rather than hampered
by the specter of judicial supervision.
Lastly, the Chicago experiment illustrates that a healthy balance between
traditional public law and new governance approaches may be necessary to
achieve innovation in social reform under circumstances of conflict. In the
absence of such protections, the increased participation of organizations and
institutions that purport to represent marginalized constituents will only legitimate regulatory strategies that further the interests of more empowered stakeholders, rather than provide outcomes beneficial to the marginalized stakeholders.3 5 1
Without a public law framework, HOPE VI as new governance will promote
gentrification and displacement, rather than resident empowerment.
This final lesson may be the most important. In her early work, Professor
Audrey McFarlane charted the history of efforts to include residents and
community members in urban revitalization decision-making from the New Deal
era to the present.3 52 She observed that over time various community development laws vacillated between rigid mandates for community participation and
unenforceable aspirations to include community members in decision-making.3 53
As the next Section shows, urban revitalization law and policy has not moved
much beyond the ossification of these two approaches. In recent bills to
reauthorize HOPE VI funding, federal legislators return to a command and
control approach to resident participation. In response, this Article attempts to
move beyond these two polar extremes, to propose a combination of measures to

351. My search for a public law framework to bolster the most marginalized stakeholders'
participation in new governance reforms resurrects a long-standing debate between advocates of Critical
Legal Studies ("CLS") and Critical Race Theory ("CRT"). This debate centered on the appropriate role of
rights in the amelioration of poverty and the promotion of racial and social justice. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Race Reform andRetrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1356 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does CriticalLegal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 304, 307 (1987); Williams, supra
note 94, at 405. See generally Williams, supra note 1,passim. While not all CLS scholars are proponents
of new governance, or vice-versa, new governance theory's penchant for informal processes over rigid
mandates fits squarely within a CLS tradition. HOPE VI, as new governance, is informality, soft law, and
extra-legal forms in action. There is merit in CLS's deconstruction of the limits of a formal rights-based
regime. However, an analysis of HOPE VI, in the context of complex and conflicting power relations,
challenges us to reconsider the role of rights, formal mandates, and judicial supervision in new
governance reforms.
352. See McFarlane, supra note 13, at 865.
353. Id.
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provide a more robust public law framework for resident participation in HOPE
VI reform without stifling innovation.
IV. A PUBLIC LAW FRAMEWORK FOR HOPE VI AS NEW GOVERNANCE

A. Hope VI Improvement and ReauthorizationAct of 2007
The future of HOPE VI is in jeopardy. The previous Bush Administration
sought to defund the program, arguing that HOPE VI had already "accomplished
its goal of addressing the needs of the nation's 100,000 most distressed public
housing units., 354 In response, federal legislators developed bills to reauthorize
HOPE VI funding and to fix the program's flaws.3 55 The U.S. House of
Representatives formulated the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2007 (HR 3524).356 The bill extends HOPE VI funding for eight more years
and authorizes $800 million in funds each fiscal year from 2008 through 2015. 3 57
The bill provides several solutions to improve the human results of HOPE VI
reform and to return the benefits of HOPE VI reform to the original residents of
public housing. The House Financial Services Committee approved the bill on
September 26, 2007. 358 The House finally approved the bill on January 17,
2008. 359

On March 8, 2007, Senator Barbara Mikulski also introduced the Hope VI
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007.360 This Senate bill extends
HOPE VI to 2013 and authorizes appropriations of $600 million dollars per year
from 2008-2013.361 The Senate bill reflects substantially different policy choices.
It does not include elaborate provisions to enhance the participation of residents
in decision-making. The Senate bill does not provide for one for one replacement
of public housing units nor does it include requirements for green development.
The Senate bill emphasizes self-sufficiency through education and relocation
services.362 The Senate bill requires future HOPE VI grant recipients to include
improvements to surrounding educational facilities in their revitalization plans.3 63

Q.

354. Libby George, Lawmakers Resist White House Effort to End HOPEVI Housing Program,CONG.
WKLY., Sept. 28, 2007, at 1; see also BARBARA SARD & LEAH STAUB, CTP. ON BUDGET AND POLICY

PRIORITIES, HOUSE BILL MAKES SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN "HOPE VI" PUBLIC HOUSING REVITALIZATION PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-16-08hous.pdf (explaining that in

response to the previous Bush Administration's efforts to eliminate HOPE VI Congress reduced annual
funding for HOPE VI by 80% to $100 million dollars in 2008).
355. While HOPE VI allocations have been reduced in 2008 there is still some bipartisan commitment
to re-funding a reformed HOPE VI program in the future. See Sard & Staub, supra note 354, at 1.
356. H.R. 3524, 110th Cong. (2007).
357. See id. §§ 13, 14; see also George, supra note 354, at 1.
358. See H.R. REP. No. 110-507, at 15 (2008).
359. H.R. 3524.
360. S. 829, 110th Cong. (2007).
361. See id. § 2(i)-(j).
362. See id. § 2(c)(6).
363. See id. § 2(d).
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This bill has not yet been approved by the Senate.
While the House bill addresses the major shortcomings of prior HOPE VI
legislation, 36 such as restoring the one for one replacement rule,36 5 it also returns
to a "command and control" approach to public housing reform. For example, the
House bill prohibits PHAs from creating strict resident selection criteria that
366
could not be grounds for evicting a family from a typical public housing unit.
Through this initiative, HUD resumes control over the development of resident
screening criteria. The objective of this provision is to stem the displacement
effects of criteria devised by private developers. Yet, this measure warrants
further analysis. Does the bill merely reinstate the old practices of HUD or each
housing authority developing set criteria to apply to each redevelopment site? If
the mixed-income approach prevails, and the new developments are still owned
by private developers, will this requirement deter tax-credit investors, private
developers and market-rate condominium purchasers from participating in the
program? Will this command and control approach stifle innovation in the
development of resident screening criteria?
The House bill also adopts a command and control approach to resident
participation, providing participation through formal public hearings and notice
and comment periods. For example, the House bill requires PHAs to provide
notices to all residents in four circumstances. First, the PHA must provide
residents with a notice of the PHAs intent to apply for an initial grant.3 67 Second,

it must provide notice of receipt of a grant award and it must present tenants with
various relocation options.36 8 Third, the PHA must provide a notice of adoption

364. House Bill 3524 requires PHAs to track all households temporarily or permanently relocated
from public housing and to develop a relocation plan that results in comparable housing for displaced
former residents. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., House Approves HOPE VI Improvement and
Reauthorization Act (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcsdem/
pressO11707.shtml. PHAs must also make efforts to assist residents using Housing Choice Vouchers
(HCVs) in the private rental market and to give residents extensions if they are unable to find replacement
housing within 150 days. Id. The bill also includes an administrative enforcement mechanism for
adversely affected residents. Id. It also allows up to 25 % of grant funds to be used for supportive services
for hard to house residents or for residents who need services to comply with the required resident
screening criteria at their redevelopments. Id.
365. The bill restores the "one for one replacement" rule removed by HOPE VI legislation. All public
housing units in existence as of January of 2005 and subsequently scheduled to be demolished must be
replaced on a one for one basis. See id. HUD can, however, reduce the required number of replacement
units by 10 percent under a narrow set of circumstances such as a "compelling need" or "extenuating
circumstances". A court order or a land shortage is an example of an extenuating circumstance. While
these provisions may create loopholes, the general consensus is that this measure will prevent significant
reductions in the available housing stock for public housing residents. A study from the Center on Budget
Priorities notes that "100,000 of the public housing units slated to be demolished under the first 15 years
of HOPE VI awards will not be replaced by other units affordable to poor families. The House bill would
stem this loss of affordable housing ... " See SARD & STAUB, supra note 354, at 1.
366. See H.R. 3524 § 8 (amending Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 with subsec. (m)(2)).
367. See H.R. 3524 § 8 (amending Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 with subsec. (g)(2)).
368. H.R. 3524 § 8.
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of a grant agreement and relocation options. 369 Fourth, and finally, it must
provide residents with a notice regarding the availability of replacement housing
at the redevelopment. 370 The House bill still encourages resident participation in
the application process and throughout all phases of the planning and implementation of the HOPE VI redevelopment plan. 3 7' However, the bill does not provide
best practices or other examples of effective measures to stimulate resident
involvement. Nor does the bill require the Secretary of HUD to establish specific
benchmarks or a ratings system to evaluate effective, rather than ineffective
participation. Lastly, the House bill requires green development as part of a
mixed-income public housing revitalization initiative.372 In this Section of the
bill, best practices and rating criteria are required.
The House bill addresses some of the critical problems with the original
implementation of HOPE VI as new governance. As such, it is preferable to
ending the HOPE VI program. The House bill adopts measures to empower
residents and to mitigate the displacement effects of HOPE VI. The House bill
restores the one-for-one replacement requirement and incentivizes PHAsPHA's
to develop plans that assist hard to house families. 373 This will help ensure that
fewer original public housing residents are displaced. However, the proposed
legislation does not resolve the historic tension between rigid mandates for
participation and broad privatized networks in which the meaningful participation of marginalized stakeholders can be easily undermined. The House bill's
mandatory and consistent eligibility standards may stem displacement, but they
may also undermine the participation of residents in development decisionmaking.
The Homer and Cabrini examples show that with proper legal and financial
support residents were able to meaningfully participate in the on-the-ground
public-private decision-making networks in HOPE VI reform. Homer and
Cabrini residents were able to help the local decision-making networks innovate
to respond to residents' needs. New governance's insight that traditional notice
and comment procedures standing alone may not adequately ensure the
participation of marginalized stakeholders has merit. At present, the participation
structures in these bills do not adequately balance the need for increased
formalization with the innovation that new governance approaches encourage.
B. Rivalry, Complementarity & Hybridity in New Governance
While this Article criticizes early new governance scholars' optimistic vision

369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. See id. (amending Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 with subsec. (1)(1)).
373. See H.R. 3524 § 7(a) (amending Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 with subsec.
(e)(2)(C)(xiii)).
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of stakeholder collaboration, increasingly, new governance scholars acknowledge the need for formal law approaches in a new governance regime. Professors
Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm recently re-envisioned a role for courts in new
governance.3 7" They propose that courts can prompt new governance institutions
to provide for the full and fair participation of affected stakeholders in new
governance collaborations. They describe the EU courts' evaluation of standing
in lawsuits as an example. They also argue that courts can "monitor the adequacy
of the epistemic or information base for decision-making within new governance." 375 Lastly, they contend that courts can promote principled decisionmaking in new governance by evaluating the "adequacy of deliberative processes
by whether they have identified, justified, and applied the criteria guiding their
decisions."37 6
Further, Professors David Trubek and Louise Trubek in their article, New
Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, explained that new governance forms and traditional regulation can co-exist
and operate in interesting and unique arrangements.37 7 Rivalry is defined as a
situation in which new governance approaches and traditional regulation co-exist
378
in a legal regime, but compete for dominance. Complementarity occurs when
both systems operate side by side in search of common goals and resolution of
problems that require multiple solutions. 379 Lastly, hybridity occurs when the
two approaches are merged into one integrated system, "in which the functioning
of each element is necessary for the successful operation of
the other," and the
380
operation of law is transformed by the process of hybridity.
Hybridity is a concept with many dimensions. As Professors Grdinne de Btirca
and Joanne Scott explain, hybridity has at least three variants: fundamental/
baseline hybridity, instrumental/developmental hybridity, and default hybridity.381 Baseline hybridity eschews unrestrained new governance. 382 Rights and
formal law still compliment new governance approaches by creating a legal
bottom floor below which new governance practices cannot travel.38 3 Developmental hybridity promotes interaction between traditional formal law and new

374. Scott & Sturm, supra note 33, at 567.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EuP. L. 539, 543 (2007) ("There are now many instances
in which we can see new governance and law operating in the same policy domain.").
378. See id. at 544.
379. See id. 380. See id. at 543.
381. See Grainne de Btirca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance,Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE iN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 9, at 1, 7-9 (defining
"fundamental/baseline hybridity", "instrumental/developmental hybridity" and "default hybridity").
382. See id. at 7.
383. See id. at 8.

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XVI

governance approaches.38 4 The goal is for new governance practices to give
content and meaning to formal law standards and public law norms.3 85 Default
hybridity relegates formal law to a default status to be complied with only if new
governance forms are unsuccessful. 386 Similarly to default rules in contracting
theory,38 7 default hybridity uses law to establish a harsh position to encourage
stakeholders to collaborate and to produce alternative more desirable positions.
While recent new governance scholarship increasingly acknowledges that
formal law may be necessary to the success of new governance forms, few U.S.
scholars have proposed how such structures should operate to facilitate microlevel decision-making. This Article draws upon all three dimensions of hybridity
to construct a public law framework for HOPE VI as new governance. HOPE VI
regulation may more effectively advance the long-term interests of public
housing residents if a hybrid approach is employed that incorporates both public
law and new governance techniques. Some new governance approaches are
retained and refined to help local public-private networks innovate, identify best
practices, respond to change, and include residents in key decision-making
networks. However, more traditional public law mechanisms such as lawyer
involvement, judicial intervention, administrative appeals, and mandates for
participation are also integrated to bolster the participation of public housing
residents and their representatives in such reform networks. 388 The following
measures should be added to the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2007, if enacted in future years.
1. Hybridity: A Public Law Framework for HOPE VI as New Governance
a. Best Practices
HUD should generate minimum baseline tenant screening criteria that local
PHAs and public-private collaborations cannot violate. Yet, consistent with'a
new governance approach, local PHAs and public-private collaborations can still
devise resident screening criteria that areis consistent with, but better than, the
minimum baseline criteria devised by HUD. Each redevelopment, in each
municipality receiving a HOPE VI grant, should be required by H.R. 3524 to
report their site-based resident screening criteria to the local PHA. Additionally,
each redevelopment should maintain a public database that tracks annually how

384. Ser id.
385. See id.
386. See id. at 9.
387. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (defining penalty default rules as "designed to give at
least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose
affirmatively the contract provision they prefer").
388. See generally David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the ManagerialCritique of
Individual Rights, 93 CAL L. REv. 1051, 1060 (2005) (arguing that a rights-based regime represents a
form of privatized performance evaluation for government programs).
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many original residents are denied admission based upon such criteria. This
report of the impact of such site-based criteria should be provided to the local
PHA every 6 months. The local PHA can then determine which criteria enabled
the greatest number of residents to return to the redevelopments. The PHA should
also be required to report such data to HUD every 6 months. With this
information, HUD can identify best practices in each jurisdiction with respect to
site-based criteria. This recommendation reflects a belief that some new
governance practices can lead to critical innovations. Thus, it may be beneficial
to HOPE VI reform to allow each redevelopment to devise some criteria suited to
its local conditions. HUD may also learn from the information collected in each
jurisdiction to update its minimum criteria.
b. Independent Resident/Developer Screening Committees
If this recommendation is adopted, an independent Resident/Developer
Screening Committee ("RSC") should be established at each redevelopment to
mitigate the potentially problematic effects of race, class and gender dynamics on
the meaningful participation of residents. The RSC must be an independent body
that may contain LAC members, but that will also include other representatives
elected by the residents. Thus, the RSC must have more residents involved than
one LAC representative. Such representatives should serve on the RSC in
staggered terms of different lengths (i.e. 6 mos, 1 year, 2 years). Although this is a
form of representative governance, the size of such a committee and the rotating
terms of resident members may provide a constant supply of affected residents
and therefore mitigate the risk of co-optation. These committees can operate
similarly to the working groups in the Homer and Cabrini examples. Residents
could lead the process of identifying representatives to the Committee. The
internet could be utilized to facilitate voting for Committee representatives.
Residents can use their own computers or publicly available computers to vote
anonymously, without having to attend a meeting. CHA could facilitate the
voting by setting up a website that enables residents to participate via the internet.
Those residents who do not have computers could vote in the usual manner. If
there are concerns about the -voting process, residents could challenge the process
as a violation of their formal legal right to participate in redevelopment
decision-making. These solutions are in addition to, not in lieu of, the
participation mechanisms mentioned in the current bill.
c. Independent Grievance Committee and Judicial Intervention
As in the Homer litigation, an independent grievance committee should be
created at each redevelopment site to hear grievances from residents regarding
the quality of their participation in such networks. The grievance committee can
also review the complaints of residents denied admission to each mixed-income
development. The grievance committee should consist of one-third CHA
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administrators, one-third representatives of the private developers, and one-third
representatives of public housing residents. While residents should be required to
exhaust their administrative remedies at the independent grievance committee
first, H.R. 3524 should also create a private right of action to enable residents and
their representatives on the RSC to enforce their group right to "maximum
feasible participation" in state or federal court. These rights will enable residents
to "bargain in the shadow" of the law in their localized-decision-making
networks. As in the Homer and Cabrini litigation, the threat of judicial
intervention may bolster the social and bargaining position of the residents'
representatives in such networks.
The private right of action to enforce the group right to participate will operate
as a regulatory penalty default rule. As Professor Bradley Karkkainen defines it,
"[a] 'regulatory penalty default' is a regulatory default rule that imposes harsh
consequences on regulated entities, and thereby heightens incentives to 'bargain
around' the default rule., 3 89 The regulatory penalty default rule stems from the
penalty default notion in contract law, whereby "a penalty default is a gap-filling
interpretive rule that intentionally imposes a harsh outcome on one or more
parties in order to create an incentive for the parties to contract around the default
rule in favor of an explicit alternative arrangement better tailored to their
particular circumstances. 3 9 °
The threat of judicial intervention, as embodied in a mandated grievance
commission and a private right of action to enforce the group right of
participation, can itself act as a penalty default rule, thereby strengthening the
resident representatives' bargaining positions. As such, public housing resident
representatives may not feel as much pressure to acquiesce in the decisions of the
private actors in the network if the decision-making process itself is subject to
judicial review and public scrutiny by other residents. Additionally, resident
representatives may be empowered by such a rule because they know that a court
can review the reasons why their position in a particular decision-making process
represented the minority view.
Lastly, because judicial intervention can cause detrimental delays to urban
redevelopment it should be an option of last resort. The private developers will
have sufficient incentives to maintain appropriate relations with residents and
their representatives throughout the development process because of the delays
that such intervention can cause. Residents will also have incentives to cooperate
as they can not access or benefit from replacement housing until the regulatory
negotiation processes are concluded.
d. Technical Assistance Funding
A large majority of the support funding available under H.R. 3524 is dedicated
389. Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 967.
390. Id.
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to providing original public housing residents with relocation assistance and
supportive services to find new comparable housing or to return to the
redevelopments. 39' This is a good allocation of funds, since studies show that
prior HOPE VI grantees failed to provide adequate relocation assistance.39 2 The
bill should also authorize additional technical assistance funding to RSCs or
public housing tenant association-owned development entities. The Cabrini
redevelopment process revealed that money for technical assistance providers
empowers residents in such networks. Those independent technical assistance
providers enabled residents to analyze and to compare development plans, as
well as to operate as informed equity partners in urban redevelopment. The
resident entities retained lawyers, accountants and planners. A substantial
commitment of HOPE VI funding should be allocated to allow resident groups
and entities to hire technical assistance providers that will help residents to
participate as equals in the complex redevelopment process.
e. The Role of Lawyers
The Homer and Cabrini processes reveal that lawyers have to have a broad
range of skills to effectively represent and to. empower residents in urban
redevelopment. The lawyers in the Homer and Cabrini litigation were primarily
skilled in impact litigation and direct services advocacy. Scholars in the field of
affordable housing and community development have long argued that poverty
lawyers must develop new transactional lawyering skills that mirror the
deal-making services that transactional lawyers provide for their for-profit
clients. 393 Yet, the lawyers in both instances recognized the limits of their
knowledge base and collaborated with other lawyers skilled in other areas. For
example, in the Cabrini litigation the Cabrini-LAC worked with lawyers trained
in litigation at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, as well as
transactional lawyers and law students at the University of Chicago Law School's
Mandel Legal Aid's Housing Initiative. Lawyers and students in the clinic were
trained in transactional techniques. Yet, those lawyers were not simply "dealmakers" committed solely to a profit oriented bottom-line. Rather, the lawyers helped
their low-income clients navigate the challenges that private sector involvement
in social reform can bring.39 4
The Homer and Cabrini examples also illustrate that lawyers assisting clients

391. See H.R. 3524 § 8 (amending Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 with subsec. (g)(4)).
392. See NAT'L Hous. LAW PRoJEcr, supra note 8, at 25-29.
393. See generally Ann Southworth, Business Planningfor the Destitute?: Lawyers as Facilitatorsin
Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 1121, 1126 (1996) (arguing that planning, more
than litigation, may lend itself to collaboration with clients).
394. Nestor Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2-3, on file with the author) (explaining that deal lawyers in public
private partnerships must also anticipate the challenges of engaging the private sector in the resolution of
public problems).
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in urban redevelopment need a variety of legal skills-transactional, litigation
and facilitative-to assist poor clients in urban redevelopment. Professors Sheila
Foster and Brian Glick describe this type of lawyering as "integrative lawyering."
The integrative lawyer "now intervenes in negotiations from which the organization or community has been excluded. ' 39 5 As they explain, [t]his new role
requires a shifting, flexible mix of skills and a more dynamic interaction with the
organization and its varied functions-policy, community education, lobbying
and organizing., 396 As such, to facilitate HOPE VI as new governance, the
technical assistance funding should be sufficient to allow resident groups to hire
integrative lawyers who have a variety of legal skills. This insight also has
implications for the training of future community development lawyers and
practitioners.
f. Participation Ratings and Benchmarking
Finally, H.R. 3524 also requires each agency to engage in benchmark
reporting. This feature reflects a new governance approach. However, the quality
of participation should be reported by each redevelopment group to the PHA and
then the PHA should provide reports about the quality of participation throughout
the project to HUD. HUD can utilize this information to develop participation
protocols, which encourage each stakeholder network to utilize best practices and
successful protocols.
CONCLUSION

Chicago's public housing reform experiment is instructive for future HOPE VI
reform. Legal advocates, public housing reformers, and public housing residents
also struggle over the future of public housing in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina. 397 Some New Orleans reformers view Hurricane Katrina's destruction as
an opportunity to rebuild and to revitalize the City through new mixed-income
communities. Other public housing residents and their advocates would like the
existing public housing to be revitalized for existing residents. Resident
participation in public-private reform collaborations will likely legitimate either
course. However, like Chicago's, New Orleans' urban redevelopment occurs
against the backdrop of social stratification along race, class, and gender lines.
The recommendations in this Article will hopefully guide future HOPE VI reform
efforts in New Orleans and beyond. Without such measures, residents may not
meaningfully participate in HOPE VI reform, and will continue to be displaced,
395. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of
Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1999, 2004 (2007).
396. Id. at 2005.
397. Julia Cass & Peter Whoriskey, New Orleansto Raze PublicHousing, WASH. POST., Dec. 8,2006,
at
A3,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/articlel2006/12/07/
AR2006120701482.html.
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rather than empowered.
Lastly, the lessons learned from this case study also suggest that a typology of
new governance approaches is needed. Perhaps in certain areas of reform, in
which the participants are similarly situated in terms of bargaining endowments
and social capital, new governance approaches can proceed unrestrained by
traditional formal legal measures. Yet, the Chicago example suggests that legal
scholars and practitioners may need to reconsider the role of formal legal
protections for marginalized constituencies in public-private reform collaborations. Future regional development efforts, and other reform experiments that
seek the participation of traditionally marginalized constituents, will need to
balance hard and soft law protections. This balancing act requires human, social
and financial resources. The present global financial -crisis makes such approaches particularly challenging in the face of dwindling resources. Yet, perhaps
the impending crisis also presents an opportunity to re-evaluate the role of law in
facilitating the participation of traditionally marginalized groups in social reform.
The Chicago example suggests that future reform efforts must incorporate
traditional legal approaches to promote accountability, while using new governance approaches to stimulate innovation and collaboration.

